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The commercial drone market has grown rapidly due to the increasing utility
and capabilities of drones. Drones offer an invaluable resource to wireless hackers.
Capitalizing on their mobility, a wireless hacker can equip a drone with hacking tools
to circumvent physical security (e.g., fences) with relative ease and reach wireless
networks.
Wireless networks are inherently more susceptible to passive capture and injection
attacks, which is exacerbated by the predominant use of Wi-Fi’s vulnerable security
algorithms. Despite the impressive leaps drones have made, they are still noisy and
hard to conceal. By equipping a drone with a directional antenna, this weakness can
be mitigated and significantly improve their effective range.
This research develops skypie version 2 (skypie v2), which is an improved software
and hardware prototype designed for directional drone-based attacks. To remain
compatible with any drone, it is designed to be lightweight, inexpensive, and easily
attachable to most off-the-shelf drones. These design choices also allow the prototype
to simulate the capabilities an individual threat actor could produce.
This research experimentally evaluates the ability of a drone-mounted wireless
attack platform (DWAP) equipped with a directional antenna to conduct wireless
attacks effectively at distances greater than 800 meters. To test this hypothesis, the
skypie v2 prototype conducts computer network attacks (CNAs) against a target
network then captured data is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the platform.
Results show that conducting CNAs from the prototype is possible well beyond
the hypothesized 800 meters when utilizing a directional antenna. Capture of a Wi-
Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) handshake is possible at a Received Signal Strength
iv
Indication (RSSI) of -72 decibel-milliwatts (dBm) which equates to 2400 meters from
a network located in a open field. Additionally, nmap scans are conducted with a
RSSI value of -74 dBm equivalent to nearly 3000 meters from the target network.
Packet loss remained below 10% when the RSSI is ≥ -72 dBm.
This research demonstrates that platform stealth may be maintained when using a
directional antenna. It develops operational drone cyber-attack capabilities, identifies
their limitations, and provides potential countermeasures to defend the attack surface
that DWAPs are expanding.
v
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DEVELOPMENT OF A DRONE-MOUNTED
WIRELESS ATTACK PLATFORM
I. Introduction
1.1 Overview and Background
Wireless devices are ubiquitous in home and work environments across the globe
today. Unfortunately if an attacker is capable of gaining physical proximity to target
devices, they are inherently more susceptible to injection attacks and having their
traffic captured. Due to the popularization and significant capability improvements
to drone technology, commercial drones can fill the need of physical proximity for
wireless hackers. By equipping a drone with sufficient hardware for wireless capture
and interaction, a motivated attacker can fly the drone within range of a desired target
and gain Remote Physical Proximity (RPP). Not only does this make it easier to reach
targets by rendering physical security measures (e.g., walls and fences) ineffective, it
allows an attacker to stay hidden and distant.
These ‘cyber-attack drones’ extend the attack surface that network defenders need
to consider. With lightweight hardware and capable commercial drones readily avail-
able, they can be developed inexpensively and rapidly. The rise of this threat is likely
inevitable and should be evaluated.
1.2 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to further develop skypie, a directional drone-
mountable cyber-attack platform previously created [1] and answer the following ques-
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tions:
• Can CNAs be accomplished at 800+ meters using lightweight equipment on a
cyber-attack drone?
• If so, how long does each attack take?
• At what distance do they become infeasible?
• How effective would these attacks be against a realistic network setup?
Development of this platform also helps identify specific threats that ‘cyber-attack
drones’ pose and aid in the development of countermeasures to minimize those threats.
1.3 Problem Statement
This research aims to investigate the evolving attack vector of Drone-mounted
Wireless Attack Platform (DWAP) platforms, specifically those equipped with direc-
tional antennas. DWAPs of this kind have been developed, but all suffer from the
same limitations because they are equipped with low-gain omni-directional anten-
nas. That is, in order for them to interact with wireless devices, they must be in
close proximity. Because drones are relatively loud vehicles, it is nearly impossible
for platforms equipped with omni-directional antenna to conduct an attack without
being audible.
Stealth is often a necessity when conducting cyber-attacks, and directional anten-
nas are well suited to fill the extended range needs of DWAPs. This work is limited
in scope to low-cost consumer hardware with a directional antenna to emulate the
limitations of a motivated lone-threat actor. In order to evaluate the new threats and
capabilities of this platform, an analysis of its limits and effectiveness is conducted.
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1.4 Hypothesis
This research hypothesizes that CNAs can be effective 800 meters or more when
leveraging a directional cyber-attack drone. Several attacks are conducted against a
target network at increasing distances, and their results are recorded. Additionally,
a packet loss evaluation is conducted to help reveal the limitations of the DWAP.
This hypothesized distance is chosen based on the results of previous research that
focused on geolocation while using the same hardware prototype [1]. The research
found that geolocation using a directional antenna could be accurate, but significantly
relied on the accuracy of the antenna bearing. In their work, the authors conducted
tests as far as 600 meters; 800 meters is chosen based on their results.
1.5 Approach
Equipment. An existing prototype, which was designed to be mountable to a
drone, is modified and further developed in keeping with its design goals. It consists
of a directional antenna, wireless interface, computer, flight collection sensors, and a
power source. The resulting prototype is used to execute the skypie software package
and conduct a set of wireless attacks against a target network.
Data Collection. The attacks chosen in this work are one of several factors
in the partial-factorial experiment conducted to determine effectiveness. Attacks
are conducted between 200-2200 meters from the targets which places the DWAP
between 2-22 times the typical maximum range of Wi-Fi devices (100 m). This
typical maximum range is listed in Section 1.6 as an assumption. Additionally, the
tests place the DWAP well beyond the hypothesized distance of 800 meters. The
collected metrics include time to completion, attack success, signal strength, and
number of network devices identified.
Analysis. The data is used to identify the range limits of individual attacks and
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if distance has a significant effect on the time to complete each attack. With that
information, the attacks’ effectiveness against realistic networks are estimated.
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations
This research operates under the following assumptions and limitations:
• All CNAs are conducted in an open field. This prevents any additional attenu-
ations due to obstacles. While this does not simulate a realistic network setup,
it eliminates unknown factors and helps control experimental results.
• The location (optimal bearing) of the target network is assumed to be known.
• CNA are conducted from a prototype that is mounted and extended on a tele-
scoping pole to simulate drone flight.
• While variable dependent, the typical maximum range for communication be-
tween two consumer grade Wi-Fi devices is assumed to be 50 m indoors and
100 m outdoors [2].
• Although capable of interaction with 5 GHz Wi-Fi devices, the CNAs are limited
to a 2.4 GHz network as they make up a larger portion of networks worldwide [3].
1.7 Contributions
This research contributes to the body of wireless attack drone research, specifically
airborne CNAs utilizing a directional antenna. It shows empirically that cyber-attack
drones can be highly effective tools capable of completing attacks well over a mile
(1609 m) from a target.
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1.8 Thesis Overview
This thesis arranged in six chapters. Chapter 2 presents a background in drone
technology, wireless technology and the associated security, flaws in wireless secu-
rity, a brief overview of the hacker methodology, and related research in the field of
drones and wireless attacks. Chapter 3 discusses the utilized prototype’s hardware
and software composition. Chapter 4 presents the experiment conducted to evaluate
the CNA abilities of the airborne directional attack platform. Chapter 5 reviews the
results of the experiment. Lastly, Chapter 6 summarizes the research and discusses
opportunities for future work in the field.
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II. Background and Related Research
2.1 Preparing For A New Threat
Drones are opening an attack space that once was mitigated by physical security.
The growing capabilities and falling cost of commercial drones are a contributing
cause. Organizations use walls, fences, and gates to prevent unauthorized access to
buildings and to serve as a deterrence for would-be attackers. If attackers are caught
trying to circumvent physical security measures, they can be pursued and captured.
One of the keys to circumvention of physical preventative measures is knowledge of
vulnerabilities. For a technically savvy adversary, drones are an ideal solution to over-
coming physical obstacles; the radio frequency spectrum is a particularly susceptible
attack vector that can be exploited to great effect. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular
technology are mediums most people use every day, but they emit signals that can
be intercepted. Through this leakage of information, people can be tracked, networks
can be mapped, and vulnerable devices can be hacked [4–6]. Drones can provide a low
cost of entry for these areas of attack. Through their use, the likelihood of capture is
lowered and they can provide intelligence while leaving little to no footprint.
A feature that could make drones used as a wireless attack platform particularly
effective is their ability to use cellular capabilities for command and control. With
cellular connectivity, there are virtually no limits to where an attacker can be while
conducting an operation. This presents more problems for those who would defend
against adversaries using these capabilities. Without the range limit of radio fre-
quency or Wi-Fi controls, an attacker need not unnecessarily expose themselves and
still can send/receive data to a drone over a cellular connection. Additionally, many
of the current mitigation techniques for malicious drones involve identifying Wi-Fi
control networks and usurping control of the drone or jamming radio frequency/GPS
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signals [7]. When a malicious drone is controlled via a cellular connection, it reduces
the likelihood of command and control being usurped. Although jamming is still a
possibility, jamming cellular signals is illegal in the United States (US) [8].
2.2 Overview
In order to appreciate the eventuality of drone-based threats, an understanding
of the rapid development of relevant technologies over the past several decades is
necessary. This research aims to develop drone-based threat capabilities with the
intent to evaluate security (i.e, WPA2) currently in place against these threats and
raise awareness of drone attacks. This chapter discusses the present state of drones
in use by the Department of Defense (DoD) and others in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
and 2.5 explains the different wireless security protocols and their weaknesses. The
terms surrounding cybersecurity and information warfare is defined in Section 2.6.
Lastly, this chapter introduces the current research involving drones that is relevant
to cybersecurity in Section 2.7.
This thesis is an extension of the research preformed by Clint Bramlette [1] and
his work developing a man-portable Multirotor-UAV (MUAV) platform capable of
CNA and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) for the purposes of mitigation
and understanding the expanding threat space that Consumer-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
drones create. As indicated in Figure 1, the focus of this research is on a narrowed
intersection of drones, wireless technology, and cybersecurity/information warfare.
With a platform readily available and capable of an array of potential attacks, more
safeguards can be developed to protect the wireless technologies on which people are
becoming ever more reliant.
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Figure 1: Exploded Venn-diagram highlighting the intersection of MAUVs, Wi-Fi,
and CNA/CNE, which is the focus of this research [1]
2.3 Drones
2.3.1 Terminology
The term “drone” has been adopted as a catch-all for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). A UAV is strictly an aerial vehicle,
and a UAS refers to the vehicle, communication link, and equipment required for op-
eration. While these terms are widely used to describe military capabilities, the term
drone also refers to commercial systems. Because of the growth of the commercial
drone market in the US, the US Congress defined UAS and public UAS in public law
as aircraft that are “operated without the possibility of direct human intervention
from within or on the aircraft” [9].
One of the most popular subcategories of drones is multirotor drones. These are
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drones that operate multiple fixed-pitch blades attached to motors for flight. In a
survey of aerial robotics, Liew et al. point out that 6-rotor hexacopters and 8-rotor
octocopters share increased interest in the research community because of their rotor
redundancy and ease of operation [10]. Normally, the control of these vehicles is
handled by onboard computers and a wireless connection to an operator. The use of
the term MUAVs throughout this thesis refers to man-portable UAS.
2.3.2 Military Drones
UAVs have been of great interest to the US military for many decades, but rapid
development only began after the U-2 downing incident over the Soviet Union [11]
and eventually led to the development of Micro-UAVs (separate from MUAV). These
Micro-UAVs began to appear in the mid to late 1990s, prompted by the US Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [12]. A few of the many developments
included Lincoln Laboratorys fixed-wing Micro-UAV and Georgia Institute of Tech-
nologies study of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) with a Micro-UAV [13,14]. The
motivation for these research projects was to provide a military capability that was
cheap and disposable. These first explorations of Micro-UAV were not exclusively
rotor driven, and also included fixed wing vehicles and insect/animal-like flapping
wing vehicles [15]. From the multi-phase Micro-UAV program that DARPA initi-
ated, several high-quality UAVs for the time were produced. Two of those UAVs are
the Wide Area Surveillance Projectile (WASP) and Tarantula Hawk (T-Hawk) [16].
The WASP was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the US
Army; it was capable of surviving high-G launches from a 155-millimeter cannon, and
could sustain flight for 15 minutes for reconnaissance [17].
With the rapid growth and investment into drone technology has come more ca-
pabilities in the matter of only a few decades. Unsurprisingly, the US is not the
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only country interested in drones. According to the Goverment Accountability Office
(GAO), from the years 2005 to 2012, the number of countries that have acquired
UAVs has jumped from 40 to 75; among the countries, there has been an increase in
military application [18]. In 2013, the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
placed orders with the company AeroVironment for MUAVs capable of 15 minutes of
flight time and speeds of 100 miles per hour called Switchblades [19]. These MUAVs
are equipped with cameras, GPS navigation, and can be operated manually or au-
tonomously to deliver a missile. These drones proved so effective that SOCOM, in its
2016 Joint Urgent Needs Statement, requested 325 additional Switchblades to help
combat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and estimated the procurement cost
to total $88.7 million dollars. General Ray Thomas, the SOCOM Commander at
the time, recounted the troubling news that some of his operators had discovered a
COTS drone that ISIS had modified to carry a 40-millimeter weapon [20]. With the
technology being embraced on all sides, it is highly probable that drones will play an
increasing role in many different facets of war.
2.3.3 Commercial Drones
Commercial drones have enjoyed explosive growth in capabilities and market
growth over the past 15 years. What was once only a hobbyist activity has reached
the hands of a much larger user base and is expected to grow to a $6.6 billion com-
mercial worldwide market by 2020 [21]. These advances can be tied to a bevy of
technological improvements such as: increased battery energy density, lower power
sensor packages, and brushless electric motors [22]. But drones owe much of their
growth to the rapid development of smartphones that occurred roughly the same
time and brought cheaper accelerometers, cameras, and Wi-Fi chipsets.
Now commercial drones are being used for legitimate purposes ranging from crop
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monitoring, power-line/pipeline inspection, wildlife surveillance, and rescue opera-
tions [23]. These activities were made legal when the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), the US’s air space governing body, introduced “part 107” which amended its
regulations on commercial drone use in 2016. These amendments replaced the lengthy
and costly waiver process for commercial drone use with a set of conditions.
With these regulations now in place, the race to integrate drone technology into
their businesses has accelerated for tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and Face-
book. Google’s Project Wing focuses on the delivery of medical equipment, such as
defibrillators, for times that require immediate medical response. Likewise, Ama-
zon seeks to integrate drones into its product delivery process [24]. While Google
and Amazon focus on physical product delivery, Facebook aims to use solar-powered
drones to deliver Internet connectivity to parts of the world that are uncovered.
COTS drones are now meeting and exceeding some of the specifications of the US
military’s MUAVs and at a comparably low cost. Table 1 lists the specifications for
many of the most popular drones available to consumers in 2018. Examining these
popular drones shows that for less than $1500, flights times of 30 minutes and speeds
of nearly 50 miles per hour can be achieved. Additionally, all of these consumer
drones are equipped with cameras and many have a range of several miles. The
competitive drone market has helped produce these products and vault them into the
mainstream. Notably, over a thousand drones were used in last year’s 2018 Winter
Olympics opening ceremony to conduct a drone light show [25].
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Table 1: Specifications of Popular Consumer Drones in 2018 [26]
Model Manu- Camera Maximum Maximum Maximum Weight Approx-
facturer (MP) Flight Flight Flight (grams) imate
Time Distance Speed Price
(minutes) (miles) (mph)
Phantom 3 Pro DJI 12 23 3.1 38.5 1280 $800
Phantom 4 Adv. DJI 20 30 4.3 45 1370 $1200
Phantom 4 Pro DJI 20 30 4.3 45 1390 $1400
Inspire 1 Pro DJI 16 15 3.1 40 3500 $3000
Inspire 2 DJI 20 27 4.3 58 4000 $4900
Spark DJI 12 16 1.2 31 300 $550
Mavric Pro DJI 12 27 4.3 40 730 $700
Mavric Air DJI 12 21 2.4 42 430 $800
Bebop 2 Power Parrot 14 30 1.2 40 530 $600
X-star Premium Autel 12 25 1.2 35 1600 $1600
Breeze Yuneec 16 12 0.1 11 350 $180
Typhoon H Pro Yuneec 12 22 1 30 1695 $1000
H920 Plus Yuneec 16 24 1 25 4990 $2800
H520 Plus Yuneec 20 28 1 38 1633 $3000
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2.3.4 Academic Interest
Drones have not only grabbed the attention of the commercial market, but also the
academic community. Their low cost and many applications have undoubtedly played
a role in this. When comparing the three year periods of 2014-2016 and 2017-2019, a
three-fold increase of publications can be seen in the IEEE database going from 522
to 1728 using the index term “drone” [27]. Some of the most recent improvements to
drone capabilities include wireless mid-air charging [28], a cooperative drone network
framework [29], video stabilization [30], autonomous infrared landing system [31], and
reliable connectivity via cellular networks [32]. Figure 2 shows the number of UAV
papers that were published in the top eight journals/conferences over a fifteen year
period. The points indicate the number of papers per year which is growing at an
exponential rate [10].
Figure 2: Number of UAV papers identified from the top eight journals/conferences
over a 15 year period [10]
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With the work from the academic community not appearing to slow, it is likely
that more contributions to drone capabilities will be added in the coming years.
2.4 Wireless Technologies
This section describes the technical details of the different wireless technologies
utilized by a large swath of devices such as routers, computers, smartphones, drones,
smart devices, etc. A focus is placed on Wi-Fi as it is one of the main pillars of this
research.
2.4.1 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi is the family of technologies and protocols defined by the IEEE 802.11
standard (hereafter referred to as simply 802.11) and is widely used throughout the
world for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) [33]. Its use can be found in many
homes and corporate networks with devices such as routers, computers, smartphones,
tablets, smart TVs, printers, etc. The basic structure of the 802.11 standard consists
of the following four physical components: (i) Access Points (APs), (ii) interconnec-
tion device (switch or router), (iii) a wireless medium, and (iv) stations (devices) [34].
In home networks, it is common for an AP and a router to be integrated into one
unit. However this is not always the case or optimal for every network. The 802.11
wireless mediums consist of the unlicensed Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM)
radio frequency bands 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz. These two radio bands are also subdi-
vided into fourteen and twenty-five different usable frequency channels respectively.
In general, the APs that utilize the 2.4 GHz band can transmit longer distances but
at lower data rates; APs that utilize the 5 GHz band can transmit shorter distances
at higher data rates.
When connecting, stations must first search the channels on the radio band they
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are utilizing to find available APs. APs can generally be identified by a Service Set
Identifier (SSID), which is assigned upon setup by a network administrator. Once
devices identify an AP available to them, they can attempt to associate with the
AP. If security is enabled, stations must first authenticate before they are allowed to
associate.
Another feature of 802.11 is Transmit Power Control (TPC) which affects 802.11a
devices [33]. This feature is used to automatically reduce the transmit power of net-
work devices when neighboring wireless networks are nearby. The AP can dictate to
its clients at what power to transmit in order to reduce interference with other net-
works. A secondary effect of this feature is increased battery efficiency and decreased
power consumption.
2.4.2 Bluetooth Low Energy
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) operates as a low-power, short-distance, low data
rate technology that can provide a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) [35].
These capabilities are different from Wi-Fi’s high power, medium distance, and high
capabilities. However, BLE requires little to no infrastructure compared to a WLAN
and is an inexpensive solution to connect a wide range of devices wirelessly. It is
common to see computer and phone peripherals connected via Bluetooth such as key-
boards, mice, and headphones. Like Wi-Fi, BLE utilizes the 2.4 GHz ISM bands, but
not the 5 GHz Unlicensed-National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) band which
802.11a uses.
2.5 Wi-Fi Security Protocols and Attacks
Over the past two decades, Wi-Fi security has evolved to address discovered
vulnerabilities. However, the rate at which these vulnerabilities are disclosed and
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the time between the evolution of the security protocols is concerning. Approxi-
mately 65% of today’s APs use Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) even though its
vulnerabilities were demonstrated as early as 2006 at the popular conference RE-
CON.CX [3] [36]. With a DWAP, an attacker can tactically exploit the majority of
wireless networks in use today and enjoy safety miles away from the target.
2.5.1 Open Configuration
For ease of access, APs offer an unencrypted option. This “open” configuration
allows users to connect to an AP without any authentication. The tradeoff for this
ease of use is that traffic flows between the AP and station in plain text unless
secured by a higher-layer protocol such Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), or Secure Socket Layer (SSL). If traffic
is left unencrypted, the traffic is vulnerable to eavesdropping. Additionally, injection
attacks (sending traffic to an AP or station while masquerading as one of the devices)
and spoofing attacks (malicious devices pretending to be a legitimate device to cap-
ture traffic) are made possible. Despite the heavy security tradeoffs, open APs are
commonly used throughout public spaces and often expected of shops to provide.
Another ease of access mechanism exists in many Wi-Fi devices for connecting
to previously used APs, but it also comes with a security tradeoff. This mechanism
continuously searches for APs by sending packets called ‘Probe Requests.’ These
packets contain a list of the SSIDs of previous connections. Because of the design
of the authentication process, this leakage of SSID information could lead a device
to connect to malicious APs. When an AP receives Probe Request packets with
its SSID, it can respond to let the station know they are within range. Because
authentication only requires that SSIDs match, an ‘Evil Twin’ (malicious AP set up
to look like a legitimate AP) could respond to a probe request to trick the device into
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connecting [6].
One final convenience feature of APs that can inadvertently assist a malicious
actor conducting an Evil Twin attack is the way stations attempt to connect to
APs. When a station reconnects to a previously used AP, if there are multiple AP
with the same SSID, it will connect to the AP with the strongest signal. If an
AP does not support Management Frame Protection (MFP), which blocks erroneous
deauthentication packets, an attacker can disassociate a station from a legitimate AP
and have a spoofed AP with a stronger signal for the station to connect to [33]. This
scenario becomes more plausible with drones added to the equation as they could
carry equipment capable of spoofing APs and have the ability to move closer to a
target for greater received signal strength at the target.
2.5.2 WEP
Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) was introduced in 1997 as the first Wi-Fi
security algorithm [37]. It implements the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream cipher for
encryption, the 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32) integrity check algorithm,
and protected with a 64-bit key or 128-bit key. This key is composed of either a 40-bit
or 104-bit secret key depending on which key size was used and a 24-bit Initialization
Vector (IV). Figure 3 depicts WEP’s security algorithm. The IV and secret key
are concatenated, creating a seed input for the Pseudorandom Number Generator
(PRNG). The resulting key sequence is XORed with the plaintext concatenated with
a generated Integrity Check Value (ICV). Importantly, the IV which is needed for the
decryption is sent in plain text with the cipher-text.
Within a few years, however, it was demonstrated that the key could be cracked
with only the cipher-text because of an implementation flaw [38]. IVs are introduced
to extend the lifetime of the secret key and should be random without repeats as
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Figure 3: WEP encipherment block diagram [37]
not to reveal portions of the key sequence. Because of the small 24-bit IVs and the
pseudorandom implementation of changing IVs, a repeat in the 16.7 million possible
IVs can be expected with 99% confidence after 12,400 frames.
Optimizations to the attacks on the security algorithm have led to WEP’s security
being broken in a negligible amount of time [39]. These attacks take advantage of
another flaw in WEP that allows replay attacks to artificially speed up the traffic for
frame capture. Since being superseded by Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WEP’s
peak usage has dropped from 45% to 6% in 2019 [3].
2.5.3 WPA
WPA was introduced in 2003 as a stopgap solution for link-layer insecurity WEP
introduced [40]. WPA uses the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for encryp-
tion. This protocol generates a 128-bit key for each packet and is, therefore, more
resilient to the IV attacks from WEP. But, WPA2 was ultimately the desired security
algorithm. WPA was put in place as a short term replacement because many APs
that utilized WEP did not have the requisite hardware required for WPA2.
Rather than offering WEP’s Open System and Shared Key authentication types,
WPA and WPA2 offer two new modes to accommodate different user architectures.
These modes are WPA-Personal and WPA-Enterprise. WPA-Personal is designed
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for small-scale use, and users are required to authenticate with a passphrase that is
8 to 63 ASCII-encoded characters. WPA-Enterprise, or WPA-802.1X, requires an
authentication server on the network to authenticate stations over the 802.1X control
port before traffic is allowed.
2.5.4 WPA2
In 2004, an amendment to the 802.11 standard introduced WPA2 [41]. For authen-
tication between devices, WPA2 implements the Extensible Authentication Protocol
over LAN (EAPOL) four-way handshake. When an end-user architecture is set to
the Personal authentication mode, a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is generated using
a cryptographic hash function. Through the use of the four-way handshake, WPA2
device pairs can verify independently that the other knows the PMK without sending
the PMK over the media. This is accomplished by having a client and AP exchanging
nonces, deriving a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), and verifying the results. Addi-
tionally, the RC4 stream cipher was replaced by the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) block cipher which utilizes a larger 128-bit key.
The EAPOL four-way handshake’s unique scheme is what facilitates the secure
authentication of devices and is depicted in Figure 4, with a station (Supplicant) on
the left and an AP (Authenticator) on the right:
• The AP sends a 256-bit ANonce (Authenticator number used once).
• Utilizing the ANonce, SNonce (Supplicant number used once), the Media Access
Control (MAC) address of the AP, and its own MAC address, the station derives
the PTK. Then the station sends the SNonce and calculated Message Integrity
Code (MIC).
• The AP now derives the PTK as it has finally received the SNonce. Then the
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AP verifies that the station knows the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) by comparing
the MICs. Upon a successful verification, an install message that includes the
Group Transfer Key (GTK) and MIC the AP created are sent to the station.
Otherwise, a deauthenticate message is sent to the station.
• Finally, the station verifies the MIC to ensure the AP’s PTK is the same and
responds with an ACK message that includes the MIC.
Figure 4: WPA2 four-way handshake [41]
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2.5.5 WPA and WPA2 Brute Force Attacks
Unfortunately, due to the implementation of the four-way handshake WPA2 is
susceptible to brute-force and dictionary attacks [42]. While this is considerably
harder than compromising WEP, it can be accomplished offline after capturing only
two of the four-way handshake messages exchanged between a client and AP during
a legitimate authentication. Within the first two messages, all of the variables (MAC
of client, MAC of AP, and both nonces) required to generate the PTK are present.
With brute force guessing or the use of pre-built dictionaries, the PMK can be verified
and ultimately the passphrase.
WPA and WPA2 are implemented with features to deliberately deter this class of
attacks. When utilizing the WPA-Personal mode, APs generate the PSK using
PSK = PBKDF2(PassPhrase, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 256) (1)
where PBKDF2 is a passphrase-to-PSK mapping function and ssidLength is the string
length of the SSID. First, PBKDF2 concatenates the passphrase, SSID, and ssi-
dLength. Then it hashes the concatenation 4,096 times with HMAC-SHA1. This
value is passed to a RSA key derivation function and results in a 256-bit output map-
ping. Then, each session established with the AP is encrypted with a unique 128-bit
key derived from the 256-bit generated PSK.
The computational intensity of 4,096 hashes is added to slow an attacker trying to
brute force a password. In order for an attacker to test a single password they must
either preform the hash 4,096 times or utilize a pre-computed PSK and passphrase
table (rainbow table). However, these tables are likely to be of limited use to an
attacker because passphrases are salted with the SSID of their AP. This makes PSK
and passphrase pairs unique to their SSID. Interestingly, the 802.11 standard warns
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that “a pass-phrase less than 20 characters is unlikely to deter attacks” [41].
Additionally, other vulnerabilities have been demonstrated over WPA2’s lifespan.
As recently as 2017, researchers demonstrated a Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK)
against WPA2 [43]. KRACK is used to trick client devices into reinstalling an already
in use key to manipulate association parameters and ultimately gain access to the
network. These new vulnerabilities make it relatively easy to bypass WPA2’s security.
2.5.6 WPA3
With multiple vulnerabilities in WPA2, the need for a new security protocol was
answered in 2018 by the Wi-Fi Alliance when they announced WPA3. Some of the
notable changes include the implementation of the Simultaneous Authentication of
Equals (SAE) handshake, mandatory MFP, and forward security [33].
Figure 5 depicts the process of a client connecting to an AP using WPA3. Three
main steps of this process are the SAE handshake, association, and the four-way
handshake. Note that the four-way handshake is still in use, but is not vulnerable to
offline dictionary attacks because of a new SAE method of generating the PMK. SAE
is a Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) and was first introduced in 2008
[44]. Both client and AP can initiate the SAE handshake by sending a commit message
containing a scalar and password element. Each peer generates these two variables
using two random numbers and the hashed password. Once the confirm messages
are received, the peers can use the scalars and password elements to mathematically
verify they each know the password. After confirmation they generate a Hash-based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and send a confirmation to their peer. Upon
verification of the HMAC, the client can request association and go through the four-
way handshake as described in Section 2.5.4. The WPA3 implementation of the SAE
handshake produces a high-entropy PMK, supports mesh networks, and prevents
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decryption of captured network traffic if the passphrase is latter discovered (forward
security) with the random numbers the client/AP produce.
Figure 5: WPA3 authentication [45]
Unfortunately, researchers were quick to find a round of vulnerabilities that can
result in password recovery, Denial of Service (DOS), or forcing devices into weaker
security groups [45]. These vulnerabilities were disclosed to the Wi-Fi Alliance and
mitigations have since been implemented. Due to the limited processing power of
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APs, the creation of a secure and efficient security protocol has proven difficult over
the past several decades. Therefore, it can be expected that new vulnerabilities will
continue to be discovered.
2.6 Hacker Methodology
As the digital age has progressed, so has the hacking community. Hacking as a
profession, which was nonexistent several decades ago, is now a viable commodity
sought after by the military, government, and even private companies. While the
terminology and methods have evolved, a common attack methodology has emerged
and is depicted in Table 2 [6]. These six steps are the processes which hackers follow
throughout CNA.
Additionally, in 2011 Lockheed Martin Corporation defined a popular methodol-
ogy known as the Cyber Kill Chain [46]. This methodology is focused on informing
Computer Network Defense (CND) resource prioritization decisions, relevant metrics,
and identifying patterns to reduce the success of adversaries.
Table 2: Hacker Methodology
1. Reconnaissance
2. Scanning / Enumeration
3. Gaining Access
4. Privilege Escalation / Pivoting
5. Maintaining Access
6. Covering Tracks
Drones have the unique potential to assist an attacker during the first three steps
of the hacker methodology. This is made possible with the RPP that they afford.
The first step for attackers is reconnaissance. This is the passive gathering of
information relevant to a target. Understanding target specific lingo, management
hierarchy, and security practices are some examples. The more attackers understand
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a target and its operations, the easier it will be to perform the latter steps. Drones
specifically can help attackers in this step with their high quality cameras and mo-
bility. They can usurp physical barriers, capture images, and other intelligence data
when properly equipped (e.g., GPS coordinates).
The second step of the hacker methodology is scanning and enumeration. It
consists of using the gathered information to conduct an active analysis of a target’s
computer network. By sending short packets to target devices, revealing information
can be returned by the receiving computer. The information can include open ports,
operating system, and network topology. A common tool used for this task is nmap,
and hackers use it to identify open ports that are often vulnerable such as ports 21,
22, 23, 443, and 445 [47]. If the services using these ports are not properly configured
and secured, they can lead to security breaches.
If networks are well isolated, a properly equipped drone can potentially help an
attacker gain a foothold in the network with its mobility and Wi-Fi capabilities.
Firewalls that block messages from outside devices can be bypassed if a drone with a
Wireless Network Interface Card (WNIC) connects to an internal Wi-Fi network and
conducts scans.
The last step a drone can help accomplish is gaining access. This can be accom-
plished by exploiting identified vulnerabilities of the machines on a target network,
convincing unsuspecting personnel to give access, also known as social engineering,
or even password cracking accounts on open machines and Wi-Fi networks. If the
need to connect to a secured internal Wi-Fi network arises, drones that are equipped




This final section discusses the research that demonstrates the offensive capabili-
ties of properly equipped drones. Also discussed are wireless vulnerabilities that could
be enhanced if integrated with a DWAP.
2.7.1 Proof of Concept: Drones That Can Hack
Even though drones have received much attention from the academic community
in the way of enhancements and their security being scrutinized, there have been few
examples of drones being used to augment wireless attacks [48]. The work that does
exist strongly suggests that drones used for wireless attacks could provide attackers
a powerful tool.
One of the first notable examples is the Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform, not
to be confused with WASP drone discussed previously. Figure 6 displays the topology
of the system. This drone was developed in 2011 by a pair of security researchers using
an Army surplus target drone (FMQ-117B), avionics components, a small computer
running Backtrack 5, and a USB 4G dongle [49]. It was capable of autonomous flight
after takeoff and all equipment used were COTS with an approximate cost of $6200 at
the time. The Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform was capable of Wi-Fi password
cracking through Aircrack-ng and other software on the Backtrack operating system.
Additionally, the drone integrated a GSM cellular attack which involves masquerading
as a GSM cell tower to capture cellphone calls and text messages [50].
The next highly relevant proof-of-concept hacking MUAV was developed by the
UK security company 4Armed in 2015. This security company developed a drone
payload in order to demonstrate the capabilities of a hacker using the leading con-
sumer drone [51]. The result of their development was a DJI Phantom 2 Vision+
equipped with a Raspberry Pi, several Wi-Fi components, a 3G cellular dongle, and
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Figure 6: Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform system design [49]
extra USB batteries. As a demonstration they created a WPA2 Wi-Fi home network,
captured the four-way handshake messages of a connecting device, cracked the pass-
word, and exploited a vulnerable Windows XP machine. Figure 7 depicts the drone
and mounted payload which cost approximately $1150.
More recently, and likely the most advanced open source hacking MUAV, is the
“Danger Drone,” shown in Figure 8. This drone was developed by two researchers
for their security consulting firm, Bishop Fox, as a penetration testing tool and was
presented at DEFCON in 2017 [7]. Rather than relying on a COTS drone controlled
through a Wi-Fi connection, the researchers created a drone from scratch, controlled
by a Raspberry-Pi and interacted with it through a 4G Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
cellular connection. This cellular connection allows them to avoid many of the jam-
ming techniques employed against drones. The platform is also equipped with a Wi-Fi
Pineapple, which is capable of impersonating APs, and WNIC to perform other wire-
less attacks. This hacking MUAV had a price tag of just under $500 and is used by
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Figure 7: DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ with wireless attack payload [51]
the company as a penetration testing tool.
Over the short few years that these drones were developed, a rapid decline of
production cost can be seen. For under $500, many of the capabilities of the Wireless
Aerial Surveillance Platform can now be achieved. With a buy-in so low and more
capable models to follow, malicious actors using these technologies are an eventuality.
2.7.2 Directional Antenna
Utilizing a DWAP requires a degree of stealth, and the use of a directional antenna
provides this functionality. Directional antennas, when compared to omni-directional
antennas, provide an extended range in a particular direction. This extended range
should be leveraged by MUAVs since they are fairly loud and therefore should main-
tain a distance from a target in order to avoid detection. The typical consumer drone
emits 76 dB which would be audible within 100 meters [52]. Law showed that with a
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Figure 8: Bishop Fox Danger Drone [7]
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Yagi directional antenna, the ideal relative angle to a target signal could be identified
with a median bearing accuracy of 9 degrees [53]. He accomplished this by connecting
the antenna to a stepper motor controlled by a Raspberry Pi and collecting signal
strength readings at different bearings. With the readings taken at several locations,
he could triangulate the target APs.
2.7.3 Cyber-Attack Drone Payload
Continuing the research thread of utilizing a directional antenna in tandem with
a DWAP, Bramlette developed a drone payload (Figure 9) and web application for
cyber-attack [1]. Unfortunately, in-motion bearing prediction of APs is far less accu-
rate than those of Law’s stationary experiments and had a median bearing error of
25 degrees. Correction of the bearing prediction is required before a more accurate
geolocation can be achieved.
Figure 9: Bramlette’s drone payload: “Skypie” [1]
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While the geolocation of signal emitters was less accurate than expected, the
framework that Bramlette developed is a solid start for further development. Modules
can be easily added to perform different attacks, and it can be controlled remotely
via a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server.
2.7.4 Identification from Location
Privacy has been a growing concern for many years, especially with the advent of
the digital age, and a team of researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
demonstrated that human mobility data is particularly revealing [4]. With as little
as four spatio-temporal points that identify a user hourly, 95% of individuals can
be identified. This is because human mobility is highly unique, and this uniqueness
can be exploited with even coarse datasets. Although cellular datasets, such as the
1.5 million user set the researchers used, does not include personal identifiers such
as address or phone number, “individual’s patterns are unique enough” to correlate
against outside information. If such a technique was integrated into a DWAPs, it could
prove to be a powerful tracking technique. With the simple modification to passively
collect beacon frames that smartphones broadcast with static MAC addresses, a covert
human mobility dataset can be built.
2.7.5 Data Leakages
In 2018, Beyer constructed a smart home consisting of 18 Wi-Fi and BLE devices
and demonstrated that pattern-of-life modeling could be accomplished by passively
sniffing wireless traffic [54]. With the collected data, Beyer was able to classify 94%
of the Wi-Fi and 75% of the BLE devices with a script. With this device information
available to him, he was able to correctly identify 95% of the smart home events (i.e.,
door locking) that occurred during his test. Even though the captured smart home
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traffic was encrypted, Beyer took advantage of the unencrypted lower levels of the Wi-
Fi and BLE protocols. Just as drones could augment human mobility tracking, drones
could be a key enabler of this type of attack. They can be employed with directional
antennas to passively collect wireless traffic well beyond a traditional omni-directional
antennas range, providing an adversary with the necessary information to replicate a
pattern-of-life attack.
2.7.6 Related Research Summary
Table 3 summarizes the related work conducted in the field of DWAPS. This re-
search does not continue investigation into Wi-Fi localization, but develops wireless
network attack capabilities for the skypie prototype [1] and evaluates their effec-
tiveness when utilizing a directional antenna. This novel approach to DWAPs has
the potential to significantly increase their operational use and is the first research
to cover the four areas: multirotor drone, directional antenna, cellular modem, and
wireless network attack.
Table 3: Related Research Summary
Fix Multi- Direc- Cellular Wireless Wi-Fi
Wing rotor tional Modem Network Local-
Drone Drone Antenna Attack ization
M. Tassey
et al. [2011] [49] X X X
J. Greenwood
[2015] [51] X X X
F. Brown
et al. [2017] [7] X X X
B. Law
[2018] [53] X X X
C. Bramlette
[2019] [1] X X X
N. Barker [2020] X X X X
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2.8 Background Summary
This chapter provides a brief summary of rapid evolution of military and commer-
cial drones. The wireless technologies Wi-Fi and BLE, are discussed as well as the
security protocols deployed to protect Wi-Fi networks along with their vulnerabili-
ties. The hacker methodology and how it can be augmented by DWAPs is explored.
Lastly, the related drone research is explained and additional wireless attack avenues




This research presents and analyzes data collected from an enhanced hardware
and software prototype previously developed by Bramlette [1] as discussed in Section
2.7.3. The sensor payload, skypie, is further developed throughout this research to
fully realize the CNA design goals of the prototype and evaluate the performance of
the attack capabilities that a directional antenna can afford. It is equipped with GPS
and an accelerometer, so that it may operate independently from the flight system of
the drone. This also allows for compatibility with drones capable of carrying weights
less than or equal to the target of 1 kg. Figure 10 shows the sensor payload’s GPS
and accelerometer (top), directional antenna and WNIC (middle), and computer and
cellular modem (bottom).
Bramlette’s sensor payload was only capable of passively collecting wireless traf-
fic autonomously on the 2.4 GHz band, be controlled via configuration files pulled
from an FTP server, or directly through a remote shell [1]. The now upgraded
skypie version 2 (skypie v2) is additionally capable of passive wireless traffic capture
over both the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz band, interacting with wireless APs, performing
WPA handshake attacks, and conducting nmap scans of target networks. The remote
configuration and control is made possible by an added 4G LTE USB modem that
establishes a cellular connection to the Internet. Cellular connectivity also notably
extends command and control theoretically across the globe.
The code responsible for control and collection is written in Python 3.7 and has
added many feature to the original skypie codebase. The modifications and added
features to Bramlette’s repository account for an additional 700 lines of code.
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Figure 10: Skypie v2 sensor prototype
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3.2 System Summary
The system has two major components: the sensor payload (skypie v2) and the
command/analysis web application (skyport). All captured data is uploaded to an
Internet-facing server which acts as an intermediary between the two components.
When using skyport, an attacker can download all of the captured data files (PCAP,
nmap results, and GPS coordinate data), view geolocation history over satellite im-
agery, and issue commands to a sensor payload. Figure 11 outlines the relationship
between the two components and how data flows between the two.
Ideally, skypie v2 should be mounted underneath a MUAV and launched at a
distance from a target that is discrete. The drone operator does not have to be skypie
v2 operator, but could be someone that works in conjunction with an attacker. An
effective team or single attacker could then fly and angle the DWAP’s antenna at the
target APs to collect wireless traffic, and conduct WPA handshake capture attacks
through skyport. Figure 12 depicts a likely attack scenario where skypie v2 could
bypass physical security on a drone and conduct CNAs against a distant network.
Captured handshakes are uploaded to the FTP server. This allows an attacker
to download and crack the WPA password on a powerful workstation rather than on
the limited hardware of skypie v2. After a successful crack, the attacker can simply
enter the password into the skypie configuration file (see Appendix A for an example
configuration file), select the AP in skyport, and then freely connect/disconnect skypie
v2 to the Wi-Fi network.
From this point, many attack options become available to the operator(s). One
useful tool is the ability to conduct nmap network scans. Skyport can also be used
to direct customized nmap scans and set time limits for each of those scans. If more
fine-tuned control is necessary, a remote shell on skypie v2 can be opened and used
in the web interface.
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Figure 11: Skypie/skyport system design [1]
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On top of being able to download all captured scans and captured data, many
collection parameters can be changed through skyport. Parameter changes include
adding Wireshark filters to wireless collection, timeout lengths, FTP upload/down-
load intervals, trigger different automated attacks, and more. All of these changes
can be sent to the FTP server even when a skypie v2 sensor is not actively pulling
configurations. If the sensor experiences a loss in cellular connection, changes are
made as soon as connectivity has been restored. If the skypie v2 is set to ‘off’ mode,
periodic checks are executed, and if new configuration changes have been uploaded
they take effect.
3.3 Design Goals
As the prototype utilized for this research was originally designed by Bramlette [1],
his design goals are adhered to when upgrading the skypie prototype. They are as
follows:
• Low Cost. With the ever increasing availability of low cost commercial drones
as discussed in Section 2.3.3, the need to model poorly resourced, yet motivated
threat actors has arisen. Therefore, a target of less than $500 is chosen for the
development of the skypie sensor payload. Note that this does not include the
cost of a drone.
• Realistic Utility and Robustness. In order to ensure that the prototype is
a reliable tool for CNA/CNE drone-based operations a set of capabilities are
sought in the hardware selection and software development. These capabilities
are:
38
Figure 12: Skypie v2 attack scenario
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i. The sensor payload should be able to operate autonomously or be securely
controlled via a remote wireless connection. If connection is lost between
sensor and attacker, communication resumes when it becomes possible
ii. Near real-time communication between sensor payload and attack should
be possible to enable feedback and control.
iii. The sensor payload should be equipped with adequate storage and battery
to enable multi-hour operations.
• Drone Architecture Portability. The payload should be independent of any
drone to which it is attached. This gives skypie the advantage of being attached
to any drone capable of the lift requirement and decouples it from the drone’s
flight system, thereby decreasing its complexity. With a modular payload, rapid
development is possible, and mitigates the possibility of becoming outdated if
linked to a singular drone. The tradeoff for this design goal is that the payload
must include its own sensors for data collection, such as a GPS module and ac-
celerometer. Additionally, a cellular modem is necessary for wireless command
and control. Notably, this may cause some overlap between the equipment on
the drone and the sensor payload (i.e., both having a GPS module).
• Low Weight. As discussed in the previous goal, additional equipment is neces-
sary in order for skypie to operate independently from a drone. According to a
2019 review of a range of medium to large consumer drones, the carry capacity
for medium sized drones ranges from 3 kg to 9 kg, and high-end drones reach lift
capacities up to 30 kg [55]. In order to most realistically reflect the capabilities
of a motivated but ill-funded malicious actor, the weight limit is set to 1 kg.
This limit ensures the compatibility with the widest range of COTS drones.
40
3.4 skypie v2 Hardware Design
Some of the hardware components for the new prototype remain the same from
the original design, but select parts are added or upgraded in order to better fulfill
the design goals. Table 4 outlines all of the parts required to build the prototype as
well as the models used, weight, and price. Highlighted in the table are upgraded
hardware components used on skypie v2. Figure 13 is a hardware schematic that
details how all of the components are assembled.
Table 4: Prototype Hardware Overview Adapted From Bramlette’s Table [1]
Part Model / Version Weight (g) Price
Directional Antenna Danets USB-Yagi TurboTenna 137 $110
Wi-Fi Interface Card ALFA AWUS036ACH 52 $60
Computer Raspberry Pi 4 Model B (4 GB RAM) 46 $55
Digital Storage 16 GB SanDisk Ultra microDSCH UHS-1 1.7 $6
Microcontroller Adafruit Metro 328 16.5 $18
GPS External Passive GPS Antenna uFL - 15mm x 15mm
Antenna 1 dBi gain 5.5 $4
Adafruit Ultimate GPS Breakout - 66
GPS channel w/10 Hz updates - V3 8.5 $40
Adafruit Triple-axis
Accelerometer+Magnetometer (Compass)
Accelerometer Board - LSM303 2 $15
Charmast 10400 mAh 3 A External
Power Supply Battery Model: W1056 228 $23
4G LTE Unlocked Modem Huawei
USB Dongle E3372-510 18 $30
Optional Sensors Raspberry Pi Sense HAT 20.4 $38
Structure 3D printed casing 52 $2
Structure Mini-breadboard 13 $2
Miscellaneous Screws, bolts, wiring, headers, USB cables,
Components solder 36 $16
Total 636.6 $419
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Figure 13: Skypie v2 hardware schematic
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3.4.1 Upgraded/New Hardware
In order to better fulfill the design goals described in Section 3.3 and support the
new features added to skypie v2, the following hardware modifications are made:
• Wi-Fi Interface Card. The ALFA AWUS036ACH Wi-Fi interface card is
selected over the previously used DNX10NH-HP for its 5 GHz compatibility.
The previous build of skypie was limited to passive capture of wireless traffic
on the 2.4 GHz band. In skypie v2, this new Wi-Fi interface card can facilitate
the capture of network data and interact with wireless networks operating in
both the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands. Another benefit of the ALFA card is the
dual antenna coaxial connectors which allows for two antennas to be equipped
to skypie v2. As shown in Figure 10, the top antenna is responsible for capture
of 2.4 GHz traffic and a bottom antenna (when connected) is responsible for 5
GHz traffic.
• Computer. The Raspberry Pi ecosystem remains an ideal platform for this
sensor payload as it is has four USB ports and GPIO pins to support multiple
sensors. The Raspberry Pi 4 4 GB model’s small price increase over the Rasp-
berry Pi Model 3 B+ comes with many advantages. It remains lightweight/low
cost and is more powerful, has 4 GB of RAM, and supports dual monitor out-
puts. These advantages fulfill many of the design goals, especially the drone
architecture portability. The added dual screen support and upgraded 4 GB
LPDDR4 SDRAM over the previous 1 GB LPDDR2 SDRAM on the Raspberry
Pi 3B+ make developing on skypie v2 easier. These quality of life improvements
allow for rapid software development all on the Raspberry Pi, enabled by a full-
feature Integrated Development Environment (IDE) (in this research: Pycharm)
run on two screens.
43
• Power Supply. A new battery is selected, because the Raspberry Pi 4 requires
a 5V/3A battery. This battery achieves a better weight to power ratio than the
previously used Aibocn battery, and can supply several hours worth of power
with a total of 10400 mAh.
• 4G LTE USB Modem. While previously out of scope of the original skypie
design, the addition of a 4G LTE USB modem is necessary to fulfill the realistic
utility and robustness design goals. The Unlocked Modem Huawei E3372-510
is a suitable choice for this goal as it has plug and play compatibility with the
Raspberry Pi’s Linux-based operating system (Raspian).
3.4.2 Retained Hardware
Upon reevaluation, the parts listed below meet or exceed the design goals and are
retained in the skypie v2 build.
• Directional Antenna. When considering antennas for skypie, the Dantes
USB-Yagi TurboTenna fulfilled the design goals of being low cost and low
weight. These are especially important considerations as directional antennas
are typically longer/heavier than omni-directional antennas. They also have
larger cross sections and could affect the aerodynamics of a carrying drone. The
Yagi directional antenna is reasonably sized at 31.5 cm in length and weighs 137
grams. The high-power beam in which the Yagi directional antenna is capable
of capturing has a beam width of approximately 56 degrees and adds a gain of
18 dBi [56].
• Microcontroller. The Adafruit Metro 328 acts as a real-time controller for
additional hardware modules added to the system. The Raspberry Pi functions
as a full fledged computer with an operating system, but does not provide real-
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time support for the required GPS and accelerometer modules. For this reason,
and because the Adafruit ecosystem has a vast array of compatible components,
the Metro 328 was chosen. Power supply and interaction with the Metro 328 is
accomplished through a single micro USB port.
• Global Positioning Module. The Adafruit Ultimate GPS Breakout (66 chan-
nel with 10 Hz Updates Version 3) was chosen to fulfill the realistic utility and
robustness design goals. This module can provide real-time GPS data at a rate
of 10 updates per second with 3-meter accuracy. Its signal sensitivity reaches as
low as 165 dBm and provides jammer detection and reduction. It is additionally
coupled with a GPS 1 dBi gain antenna to enhance its reception capabilities.
• Accelerometer. Chosen for its compatibility with the Metro 328 and compact
form factor, the Triple-axis Accelerometer + Magnetometer (Compass) Board
LSM303 is a necessary module for directing skypie. With the use of a directional
antenna, it becomes necessary to know the bearing at which the drone is pointed,
so that the antenna’s high-powered collection beam is oriented towards target
networks.
• Optional Sensors. For development purposes, the Raspberry Pi Sense Hard-
ware Attached on Top (HAT) is included in this build. While this sensor in-
cludes atmospheric pressure, humidity, and gyroscopic readings, it is exclusively
used as a development tool. This module falls under the drone architecture
portability goal and its Red-Green-Blue (RGB) Light-Emitting Diode (LED)
panel is used to facilitate rapid development as a debug tool. Colors and text
are displayed on the panel to indicate the mode and configuration of skypie.
This serves as a diagnostic tool when developing and testing the payload. See
Table 13 in Appendix B for a description of the RGB indications.
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• Structure. Shown in Figure 14 are the assembled 3D-printed parts that se-
curely mount all of the skypie’s components. The material used in the printing
process is Polylactic Acid (PLA), which is a biodegradable filament.
Figure 14: Skypie 3D printed structure components [1]
3.5 skypie Software
The skypie software package is written almost exclusively in Python 3.7. The
exceptions are the code to control the microcontroller and the geodesic intersection
algorithms which are both written in C++. This C++ code remains in the repository
as it was previously developed by Bramlette [1], but is unused in this research. The
software repository consists of three packages: skypie, skyport, and shared. Each
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package contains modules that control and support the features of the sensor payload
and web application. These modules are discussed in the following sections, with an
emphasis on the new features added to skypie v2.
3.5.1 Design Constraints
Design constraints followed during the development of the original skypie are
adhered to while building skypie v2. These constraints as discussed in [1] are listed
below:
• Fine-tuned control of the sensor payload can be achieved through modification
of a single configuration file. While manual control is possible through a re-
mote shell, an attacker’s workflow is simplified with access to a multi-module
configuration file. The skyport web application, provides an attacker a help-
ful Graphical User Interface (GUI) for modifying this configuration file which
facilitates rapid control over several wireless attacks.
• The skypie program runs in a control loop and configuration changes are handled
at the beginning of each loop.
• The control loop spawns new threads as directed by the configuration file to
complete subtasks (e.g., passive Wi-Fi traffic collection, WPA handshake cap-
ture, nmap scans, etc.) and those threads are initialized with the parameters
(e.g., Wireshark filters, target MAC addresses, timeouts, nmap search para-
maters) also in the configuration file.
– Threads currently running are not affected by configuration changes. This
adheres to Python’s best practice guidelines and ensures that unexpected
behavior is minimized.
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• Threads are completed asynchronously, which allows the main control loop to
continue while multiple tasks are completed.
– Starting threads that can interfere with the Raspberry Pi operation of a
running thread will be deferred until the completion of the running thread.
• Threads are initialized with a parameterized run time. This is to ensure that
threads lifetimes are finite and prevent the need to interrupt threads. This
comes with the benefit of easier code implementation and being less error prone,
but has the disadvantage of transition intervals where wireless data could be
missed.
• Due to the mobile nature of an attacker and sensor, it is not likely that either will
have a static IP address. Therefore, to facilitate secure communication between
the two, an Internet-facing FTP server is used as a ‘dead drop’ location. While
in operation, skypie periodically uploads the files it has captured/created and
downloads new configurations. This allows an attacker to login and download
all captured files and issue new commands at anytime.
• Analysis and cracking is performed on an attacker’s workstation through the
system’s second main component (skyport). Just as skypie is controlled by one
configuration file and operates with a control loop, so does skyport.
• To ensure the robustness of skypie’s software, the operating system is set up
with a chron job. This chron job checks periodically that the skypie program is
running and if not, it restarts the program. This protects against unexpected
crashes and ensures dormant sensors are routinely “checking in”.
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3.5.2 Updates to the skypie Package
The skypie package contains the code run solely on the payload’s computer. This
computer (Raspberry Pi) requires a Linux-based operating system and several soft-
ware packages. Listed in Table 5 are all of the dependencies with new dependencies
highlighted.
Table 5: skypie v2 Dependencies
Package Function
aireplay-ng Injecting generated packets (i.g., deauthentication packets)
airodump-ng Targeted WPA handshake capture
dumpcap Capture packets from Wi-Fi interface
iwconfig Get Wi-Fi adapter settings, set monitor mode/channel
ifconfig Prepare WNIC for monitor mode
iwlist Get Wi-Fi interface current channel
nmap Conduct network scans
tshark Makes packet captures available to Python for analysis
The structure of this package builds upon the previous skypie model [1]. As
shown in Figure 15, when the software is initialized, the manager module is invoked
to manage the main control loop. At each iteration through the control loop, the
configuration file is read and requested changes are processed. These changes may
be simply variable management or requests to start a new thread. The following
sections discuss the modifications and additions to the skypie package. Figure 15 also
highlights the upgrades and behavior of the skypie package.
Nearly all Python modules in this package are written as thread classes so that
they can run in parallel. In skypie v2, there are six additional threads, and mod-
ifications to interface.py. Notably, manager has been modified to prevent clashing
threads from starting, a timeout has been added for all attack threads, and target
AP information is provided to the threads.
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Figure 15: Skypie v2 control flow diagram
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3.5.2.1 interface.py
As Bramlette’s research focused on the geolocation of all APs in proximity of
skypie, this module is built with inherent Wi-Fi channel hopping. In order to allow
for focused attacks, modification of this module is necessary. On top of the ability to
select and manage the settings of an asynchronous channel-hopping wireless interface,
a target AP can be indicated by its MAC address. When a target is specified in the
configuration file, the manager module periodically calls scan module which runs the
command
iwlist [WNIC] scan
Its results are parsed to identify the current channel of the target AP and if the skypie
v2’s channel does not match, the module sets the interface to the current channel.
3.5.2.2 handshake.py
This module is responsible for the capture of WPA handshakes of a specific target.
This can be accomplished passively or in conjunction with the deauth attack discussed
in Section 3.5.2.3. The thread class that makes up this module checks if the wireless
interface being used is in monitor mode during initialization, and start an airodump-
ng capture with the command
airodump-ng --bssid [SSID] --c [channel] -w [filename] -o
pcap [WNIC]
Until the timeout specified in the sensor’s configuration file is reached, the airodump-
ng output is parsed for a successful WPA handshake indication. Captured handshakes
are saved in pcap files in the ‘./data/synch/handshake’ directory following the naming
convention ‘WPA-Handshake-[MAC address].pcap’ along with the signal strength of
the AP in the file ‘signal-strength.txt’.
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3.5.2.3 deauth.py
The thread class defined in this module can be used as a helper thread to the
handshake module discussed in Section 3.5.2.2, or as a DOS tool. In either case, the
use of this module can be detected by the target network and should be used sparingly
in order to avoid detection. When initialized, the target AP’s MAC address from the
sensor’s configuration file is fed to aireplay-ng to craft a WPA deauthentication mes-
sage with the command
aireplay-ng --deauth [number of packets] -a [MAC address]
[WNIC]
Until the timeout specified in the configuration file is reached, the crafted erroneous
deauthentication message is sent every five seconds. If the targeted AP does not
support management frame protection, these deauthentication messages force all con-
nected devices to disconnect. The five-second interval allows enough time for con-
nected devices to reauthenticate, but if the timeout for this thread is set for a long
duration, it effectively becomes a DOS attack.
3.5.2.4 connect.py
On the Linux-based Raspbain operating system, Wi-Fi connections are handled by
the ‘wpa supplicant’ process. This process is controlled through a GUI on the desktop
that modifies a configuration file, or by direct modification of the configuration file
with the command line interface ‘wpa cli’. The connect module is a thread class that
reads the configuration file, adds a specified AP’s credentials (if not already present),
and reconfigures the ‘wpa supplicant’ to connect to the AP. See Appendix C for the
code and commands that accomplish these tasks.
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3.5.2.5 ping.py
This concise module is a threaded class responsible for managing a ping subpro-
cess. Used in the experiments and discussed in Chapter IV, this module sends 10
ping packets to the IP address specified in the sensor’s configuration file with the
command
ping -c 10 [ip address] [filename]
Then it saves the results file to the ‘./data/synch/ping’ directory following the nam-
ing convention ‘ping-[MAC address].txt’. Appended to the results file is the signal
strength of the AP, which is parsed from iwlist’s results. Because ping requires a
connection to a network, the manager module has logic in place to ensure that the
sensor is connected before this thread can be created and started.
3.5.2.6 nmap.py
The nmap module is used to conduct any desired nmap scan per the parameters
passed in the sensor’s configuration file. The output is saved in the ‘./data/synch/n-
map’ directory appended with the received signal strength of the AP. The command
in this research’s experiments is:
nmap -p 21,22,23,443,445 -T4 -v -oN [filename]
The results are saved in the following file format ‘Nmap-[MAC address]’. Just as all
other attack threads, the nmap thread module has a controllable timeout in order
to ensure that a scan is completed in a timely manner, and the thread does not get
stuck in an infinite loop.
3.5.2.7 scan.py
This thread is periodically called, dependent on the sensor’s configuration files,
by the manager to fill a dictionary (‘./data/synch/available-networks.txt’) with all
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the available APs in the sensor’s collection range. This is accomplished by parsing
the data returned from iwlist’s scan command. The dictionary created is used by
many of the other threads, and is made available to the attacker via the FTP server.
The interface thread uses the created dictionary to ensure that the target AP has not
hopped channels, and if it has, the thread changes channels accordingly. The connect
thread requires the SSID of an AP as a connection parameter and searches the scan
dictionary by MAC address to obtain it.
3.5.3 Microcontroller/Geodesic Intersection Algorithms
This research does not modify code for the Adafruit 328 microcontroller, which
is responsible for the collection, parsing, and formatting of hardware module data.
This data includes GPS coordinates, bearing, altitude, and timestamps. These jobs
are controlled by the C++ code loaded on the microcontroller. Additionally, the
geolocation algorithms that are used for data analysis are written in C++. While
this code is still present, this research focuses on the effectiveness of skypie v2 as a
cyber-attack tool.
3.6 Design Summary
This chapter outlines the skypie v2 prototype and its upgraded attack capabilities.
Staying true to the original design goals of the skypie prototype outlined in Section




4.1 Overview and Objectives
The experiment conducted during this researched is aimed at testing the effec-
tiveness of CNA capabilities using light-weight equipment on a cyber-attack drone.
As discussed in Section 2.7.2, to avoid audio detection, a drone should maintain dis-
tances greater than 100 meters. Although the typical range of consumer Wi-Fi devices
ranges from 50 meters indoors to 100 meters outdoors, utilizing a directional antenna
can extend that reach by multiples times.
This research extends Bramlette’s work by adding attack capabilities to skypie
and attempting to answer the following questions:
• Can CNAs be accomplished at 800+ meters using light-weight equipment on a
cyber-attack drone?
• If so, how long does each attack take?
• At what distance do they become infeasible?
• How effective would these attacks be against a realistic network setup?
It became clear during the first experiment where the attenuator factor is set to
none, the available open field real estate became a limiting element. To mitigate this,
an attenuator is added to the System Under Test (SUT) as a factor to artificially add
attenuation and simulate additional distances.
4.2 System Under Test
Figure 16 displays the SUT and Component Under Test (CUT) diagram. The
parameters that change through the experiment are factors, and are covered in Sec-
tion 4.3. These varying factors are measured with the output metrics (discussed in
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Section 4.4). The computing parameters and constant variables are those that are
held constant throughout the experiment and covered in Section 4.5.
4.3 Factors
Factors are parameters that are varied throughout the experiment. The factors
identified in Figure 16 are listed below and summarized in Table 6.
1. Attack Mode. Three tasks are chosen to test skypie’s attack potential and
evaluate the performance of the SUT. The tasks are (1) WPA handshake capture
attack, (2) nmap scan of the target network, and (3) 10-ping burst collection.
The handshake capture and nmap scan are realistic and useful attacks that are
chosen to demonstrate CNAs can be accomplished on the selected hardware.
The ping burst collection is used to understand and graph at what distance
communication with a target AP becomes infeasible.
2. Distance. This is the distance in meters that the sensor payload is from the
target AP. The experiments are conducted with 200-2200 m between skypie v2
and the AP for a total of 11 collection points. The varying distances allow for
the analysis of attack performance as distance grows.
3. Attenuator. To simulate additional distance beyond the physical limitations
of the test site, the use of an attenuator is necessary. The experiments are run
with the following configurations: no added attenuator and a 15 dB attenuator.
Figure 17 shows the attenuator. The attenuator is installed between the wireless
interface card and the directional antenna.
56
Figure 16: System Under Test and Components Under Test
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[ WPA handshake capture, Different automated tasks performed
nmap scan, ping burst ] on the target Wi-Fi network
Distance
[200 meter increments] Open field space where tasks are
from 200-2200 meters completed in different intervals
Attenuator [ none, 15 dB]
Added attenuation to simulate
additional distance




Metric are the output or response variables of the experiment. Their expected
ranges are displayed in Table 7 and are discussed in further detail below.
1. Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI). This is a measurement of
the amount of energy that skypie’s antenna receives. It is measured in decibel-
milliwatt (dBm), which is an electrical power unit in dB relative to one milliwatt




Because dBm is exponentially related to mW, 0 dBm is equal to 1 mW. De-
creases in 3 dBm represents the halving of power (i.e., -3 dBm equals 0.5 mW).
2. Attack Success. This is a binary measurement of whether the WPA handshake
or nmap scan is successful at a given distance.
3. Time To Success (TTS). For the WPA handshake attack, this is the time in
seconds it takes for the attack to capture one of the required EAPOL packet
pairs (message 1 and 2 or 2 and 3). For the nmap scan, this is the time it takes
for the nmap scan to complete. If the attacks fail to complete before the given
timeout, they are assigned the time of their respective timeouts (30 seconds for
WPA handshake attack and 120 seconds for the nmap scan).
4. Hosts Identified. On top of tracking the time nmap scans take, the efficiency
of the scans can be measured by the percentage of hosts identified on the tar-
get network. This is accomplished by recording the number of host identified
through each scan divided by the six known hosts on the target network.
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Table 7: Experiment Metrics
Metric Units Expected Range
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) dBm −85 dBm ≤ RSSI ≤ −30 dBm
Attack Success -
Attack Success = 0
Attack Success = 1
Time To Success (TTS)
s 0 s ≤ TTS ≤ 120 s
or Timeout
Hosts Identified - 0 ip ≤ TTS ≤ 5 ip
4.5 Constant Parameters
When conducting the experiments, there are several parameters held constant
throughout. While varying these parameters may have an effect on the response
variables, it is necessary to limit the scope of this research and hold them constant.
Table 8 summarizes these parameters, and they are discussed in further detail below.
• Target Network Orientation. The target network is set up by placing the
four HP Zbook 15 laptops on the corners of a plastic folding table in different
orientations, and the Netgear AC1750 AP is placed in the center of the table
with the three antennas placed in a standard configuration (see Figure 18).
Power to the AP is obtained from a AC inverter plugged into a running car,
while the laptops run solely on battery power.
• Location. The location is flat (ideal wireless conditions) and has 2200 m of
open field available. Figure 19 shows the field used and the target network loca-
tion which is adjacent to an airfield runway. Figure 20 shows ‘drone-mounted’
skypie v2 at the 1600 m distance.
• Number of Targets. There is a total of five devices that make up the tar-
get network. The first is the Wireless AP and the remaining four devices are
identical model laptops imaged with Windows 10.
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Table 8: Constant Parameters
Parameters Proposed Values Controlled By
Target Network Pre-defined layout
Experiment Design
Orientation (see Figure 18)
Location Airfield (2200 meters) Experiment Design








Surface Book 2 Laptop
Experiment Design
Wireless Power Full Power 537mw
Experiment Design
Configurations Windows 10 Default Power Settings
‘Drone’ Elevation 13 ft Experiment Design
WPA Handshake
30 seconds Device Configuration
Timeout
Nmap Timeout 120 seconds Device Configuration
Nmap Scan
-p 21,22,23,443,445 -T4 -v Device Configuration
Parameters
AP Scan Interval 15 seconds Device Configuration
• Target Models. The laptops and AP models are chosen for their sufficient
capabilities. The laptops are realistic up-to-date network devices running a
Windows 10 version 1903, and the AP has firmware version V1.0.1.52 1.0.36.
The AP is configured to use the 2.4 GHz 802.11n standard because it has the
greatest data rate.
• Command and Control Devices. Two devices are used to control skypie
v2 throughout the experiment. The first is a Moto x4 cellphone that operates
in wireless AP mode and facilitates a connection to the Internet with its 4G
LTE connectivity. The second device is a Surface Book 2 laptop that is used to
control skypie v2.
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Figure 18: Target network orientation
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Figure 19: Open and flat location used in the experiment (map data: Google)
63
• Wireless Power Configurations. The AP has the ability to adjust its power
output, but the default configuration of 100 percent transmit power (537 mW)
is chosen to reduce the experiment’s complexity. Additionally, Windows 10 by
default adjusts the power sent to the wireless adapter depending on the power
plan selected. For the purpose of this experiment, the power settings are left
as default on the four laptops. This affects the distance at which the laptop’s
wireless traffic can be captured, but simulates a realistic network configuration.
• ‘Drone’ Elevation. To simulate flight, skypie v2 and the battery are mounted
to a wooden platform shown in Figure 21. The wooden platform is screwed into
a telescoping pole via iron pipe fittings (see Figure 22). The telescoping pole is
extended to 13 ft, which adequately emulates a drone in flight.
• WPA Handshake Timeout. A 30 second timeout is chosen for the WPA
handshake attack, because it disconnects and prevents connection to the target
network for the duration of the attack. To prevent suspicion, these attacks
should be as swift and unobtrusive as possible.
• Nmap Timeout. A 120 second timeout is selected for the nmap scan based
on the number of devices on the network and scan parameters. Unlike the
handshake capture attack, an nmap scan does not cause a DOS. This allows
for a lengthy timeout period, and preliminary tests indicated that this is an
adequate time for completion.
• Nmap Scan Parameters. A standard nmap scan that searches for a select set
of often vulnerable ports with the speed ‘T4’ selected to ensure rapid completion.
• AP Scan Interval. In order to ensure that an updated RSSI is documented
between each of the different experiment tasks, an interval of 15 seconds is
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chosen. This ensures timely updates and that the RSSI reading is as accurate
as possible on the given hardware.
Figure 20: Conducting wireless attacks with skypie v2 at 1600 Meters
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Figure 21: Skypie v2 and battery mounted to platform (left) Telescoping pole outfitted with iron pipe screw fitting (right)
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Figure 22: “Simulated drone flight”: skypie v2 platform mounted on telescoping pole
via iron pipe fittings
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4.6 Uncontrolled Variables
The 2.4 GHz band is highly utilized by public and private entities. Although
the experiment location is relatively secluded, the high-gain directional antenna used
is likely to pick up signals from non-experiment devices. These signals may cause
interference, but the additional traffic simulates a more realistic noisy environment
for which the skypie v2 is designed.
An additional uncontrolled variable is the use of a cellular connection to communi-
cate with the FTP server. There are many factors that can affect a cellular connection
including distance from cell towers, the weather, and the current congestion of the
network. But like the uncontrollable nature of Wi-Fi networks, skypie v2 is designed
to operate in these conditions.
4.7 Experiment Design
This section provides detailed steps for each experiment. The attenuator factor
changes between each of the experiments. Experiment 1 is conducted with no at-
tenuator and experiment 2 is configured with the 15 dB attenuator (Figure 17) in
between the antenna and wireless interface. Figure 23 depicts the relative locations
of the devices in the experiment. As no statistical comparisons are made between
two devices, treatments are limited to 5 samples each.
4.7.1 Experiment 1: No Added Attenuation
1. Skypie v2 is turned on and set to automatically connect to the command and
control cellphone’s wireless AP via the Raspberry Pi 4 on board wireless inter-
face card. A command and control laptop is also connected to this network and
uses SSH to start a shell script by issuing the command
sudo ./skypie cron.sh
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Figure 23: Experimental Design Block Diagram
This script (see Appendix D) checks if a skypie process is already running and
if not starts main.py which subsequently initializes manager.py.
2. The mounted skypie v2 is moved west in 200 meter increments away from the
target network, which are measured and marked with the pink flags shown in
Figure 24. The telescoping pole is placed in the PVC sheath (see Figure 25) at
each location to stabilize the platform in order to maximize consistency of data
collection.
3. With the directional antenna angled at the target network, the laptop operator
modifies the configuration file to change the attack mode of the skypie v2 and
connect to the target network. Note that each of the attack thread records
the RSSI of the AP 3.5.2 upon completion of it’s operation. The attack modes
and connection are conducted in the following order with a 15 second interval
between each:
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• Capture mode. This mode simultaneously runs the deauth thread (Sec-
tion 3.5.2.3) and the handshake thread (Section 3.5.2.2) to capture a WPA
handshake.
• Connect to the target network using the connect thread (Section 3.5.2.4).
• Ping mode. This mode runs the ping thread (Section 3.5.2.5) to capture
network statistics.
• Nmap mode. This mode runs the nmap thread (Section 3.5.2.6) to iden-
tify the target network devices.
• Cycle through each attack mode and connection to the AP five times.
4. The equipment is moved to the next 200 meter distance.
5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until reaching the 2200 meter distance.
Figure 24: Flag markers and measuring tool
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Figure 25: PVC sheath used to stabilize the mounted skypie simulating drone flight
4.7.2 Run 2: 15 dB Added Attenuation
This experiment is conducted to identify the limit of each task and map the packet
loss as distance increased.
1. Using the feedback from experiment 1 that all the tasks are running at 2200
meters with no timeouts or failures, the mounted skypie v2 starts at the pre-
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marked 2200 meter location.
2. Start up skypie v2 following Step 1 of the first experiment in Section 4.7.1.
3. After using the PVC sheath to stabilize and angle the directional antenna toward
the target network, the command and control laptop operator modifies the
configuration file to cycle through the attack modes as outlined in Step 3 of
Section 4.7.1. For this experiment during the five loops at each location, a task
is not repeated if it times out during the first iteration.
4. Move the equipment east (toward the target network) to the next 200 meter
marked location.
5. Repeat Step 3 and 4 until either of the conditions are met: ping packet loss is
less than 75 percent or the WPA handshake attack does not time out. In order
to capture more precise ping packet loss and WPA handshake capture data,
collections are conducted to the east and west of where these conditions occur.
4.7.2.1 Ping
Figure 26 depicts the movements of skypie v2 after ping packet loss falls below
75% to conduct more precise cycles of the Ping attack mode. When skypie v2
achieves < 75% ping packet loss, skypie v2 moves east 25 meters and follows
Step 2 a total of two times. Then skypie v2 moves 75 meters (past the starting
condition distance) to the west and follows Step 2. Next skypie v2 moves 25
meters and follows Step 2, repeating this until packet loss of < 25% is achieved.
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Figure 26: Ping mode’s capture process (experiment 2)
4.7.2.2 WPA Handshake Capture
Figure 27 depicts the movements of skypie v2 after the first successful WPA
handshake capture to conduct more precise cycles of the capture attack mode.
When skypie v2 successful captures a WPA handshake of the target network,
skypie v2 moves east 50 meters and follows Step 2 a total of two times. Then
skypie v2 moves 150 meters (past the starting condition distance) to the west
and follows Step 2. Next skypie v2 moves 50 meters and follows Step 2, repeat-
ing this until a WPA handshake is captured in ≤ the median capture time of
experiment 1 (0.548 s).
Figure 27: Capture mode’s capture process (experiment 2)
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4.8 Summary
This chapter outlines the designed system’s parameters, outputs collected, and
experiment design processes of this research at length. Additionally, the uncontrolled
variables are covered. The metrics collected are used to evaluate and assess the
effectiveness of the design improvements.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
This chapter describes the results obtained from the two experiments outlined in
Chapter 4. The results of each experiment is responsible for answering one or more
of the research questions from Section 4.1.
Section 5.2 covers the experiment with no added attenuation. The results in this
section are used to accept the hypothesis that CNAs are possible on the lightweight
equipment of skypie v2 at distances greater than 800 meters.
Experiment 2 helps evaluate the effectiveness of each of the attacks/tasks and their
limits. Section 5.3 discusses the limit of each of the attacks/tasks. Lastly, Section 5.4
addresses the final research question of how effective these attacks would fair against
a realistic network setup. The added attenuation of buildings and the distance at
which a skypie v2 would need to be to remain effective are discussed.
5.2 Experiment 1: No Added Attenuation
Skypie v2 is not equipped with an attenuator in this experiment. But as it shares
the same location as the second experiment, its results are useful for comparison and
analysis. The experiment location has a 2200 meter space limit, and attacks/tasks
are only completed in 200 meter increments unlike experiment 2.
5.2.1 WPA Handshake Capture Results
At each of the 11 collections points, skypie v2 cycled through all of the attacks/-
tasks 5 separate times. The first of which is the capture of the EAPOL packets which
make up the WPA four-way handshake (as discussed in Section 2.5.4). This step is
required in order to infiltrate a network as captured EAPOL packets can be used to
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crack the password of a network. While other methods to gain access to a network
exist, like KRACK (see Section 2.5.5), those are out of the scope of this research and
a handshake capture attack satisfies this step.
With a timeout set for 30 seconds, the WPA handshake capture attack performed
well at all locations. The time to capture over distance are depicted in a boxplot
graph in Figure 28. At each collection point, the attack’s time to completion had a
median of under 5 seconds and a average median across all collection points of 0.548
seconds. Out of the 5 runs, only one timed out at 2000 meters, and is considered an
outlier. The test locations 1200, 1400, and 1600 had time to capture results slightly
longer than the other locations. This is likely caused by the skypie v2’s directional
antenna being slightly blown out of alignment with the target AP which simulates a
realistic flight environment.
To determine if there is a difference in the time to capture a handshake across
the 11 capture points (treatments), Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is conducted over
the results. Assuming the null hypothesis (H0: there is no difference in mean time
to capture between treatments), a F statistic of 0.613 is calculated. At significance
level of 0.05, the critical value is 2.286751. Because the F statistic is less than the
critical value, the null hypothesis, that the mean time to capture is the same for each
location, is failed to be rejected. This indicates that across the 11 capture points
there is no difference between their capture means, capture of WPA handshakes is
possible farther than 2200 meters, and additional data is needed to determine the
limit of this attack.
5.2.2 Ping Results
The next task after connecting to the target network, is sending a burst of ping
packets and recording the results. To analyze the performance of sending and receiv-
76
Figure 28: Boxplot of time to capture handshakes at each test location (experiment
1)
ing Wi-Fi traffic via skypie v2’s hardware, the packet loss at each collection point
is graphed with a boxplot as seen in Figure 29. Similar to the success of the WPA
handshake capture, this task’s packet loss is low. Each location had a median of 0
percent packet loss. Only the 500 and 1500 locations had trials with packet loss that
were not outliers. This indicates that a connection at every location is very reliable
and could support a variety of activities.
5.2.3 nmap Results
The final task is an nmap scan of the target network. This task’s performance is
heavily dependent on the reliability of the network. As nmap scans are conducted
by sending packets to potential target devices, it is important to have a reliable
connection so nmap can accurately assess the network. As the nmap scans are all
conducted with the same parameters (same number of packets sent/received), it is
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Figure 29: Boxplot of ping packet loss at each test location (experiment 1)
expected that they should all take roughly the same time to complete with negligible
increases over longer distance, while the network connection is reliable. From the
results of the ping burst test, the nmap attack is expected to perform well and identify
all hosts on the network.
Figure 30 shows the results for the nmap attack of experiment 1. For all collection
points, the hosts identified had a median of 100%. Only at the 600 location did one
trial fail to identify any hosts and this is also likely due to the directional antenna being
blown out of alignment with the AP. Additionally, an ANOVA test is conducted with
a significant threshold of 0.05 over the completion times of the scans. The F statistic
is calculated to be 0.709 and a critical value of 2.291282 is found. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is not rejected and the mean scan times are the same at each location. The
scans took an average of 20.6564 seconds to complete. These results are expected;
a better evaluation of performance is conducted in the second experiment where the
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reliability of the network is worse due to the addition of the attenuator.
Figure 30: Boxplot of hosts identified by nmap at each test location (experiment 1)
5.2.4 Experiment Summary
Figure 31 shows a boxplot of the RSSI readings at each of the attack locations
with weaker signals displayed with reds on a yellow to red gradient. A total of 165
individual readings are taken and boxplot outliers are marked as black dots. At the
farthest point (2200 meters), the signals have a median strength of -74 dBm. This
strength for Wi-Fi signals is considered weak, but a minimum strength for reliable
packet transfer [57].
Using the transmit power of the wireless AP (Ptx), the dBi gain of the sending
(Gtx) and receiving antennas (Grx), and the Free Space Path Loss (FSPL) formula
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Figure 31: Boxplot of the RSSI at each test location (experiment 1)
the expected RSSI (Prx) can be calculated with




Prx = Ptx +Gtx +Grx − FSPL (4)
where λ is the speed of light divided by the 2.4 GHz frequency and d is the distance
in meters between transmitter and receiver respectively.
Once the expected results are calculated, an analysis between the expected and
measured signal strength readings are conducted. Table 9 depicts the summary of
results at each test location, which displays the expected signal strength value, and
the errors that show the difference between expected and measured strength (i.e,
expected - measured). Several distances (200, 2000, and 2200) do not have sample
sizes of 15 due to human error. The average median error between the expected signal
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strength and measured is -13.81 dBm. As discussed in Section 4.6, there are many
uncontrollable factors that can attenuate wireless signals. However, the size of this
additional signal loss indicates that there is another unknown environmental factor
affecting the experiment. Further insight into this error would require testing the
accuracy of the skypie v2’s WNIC’s RSSI readings and the transmit power of skypie
v2’s AP which is out of the scope of this research.
While 2.4 GHz 802.11 devices’ range is typically limited to 100 meters outdoors,
point-to-point connections are possible over many kilometers utilizing dual directional
antennas. These setups however require a line of sight between the station/client;
because of this limitation they are rarely used. Most wireless networks are set up as
point-to-multipoint networks using omni-directional antennas.
This experiment demonstrates the potential and utility that a single directional
antenna provides when used on drone-mounted wireless attack platform to conduct
CNAs. Even when 802.11 traffic has degraded over great distances, the lightweight
equipment of skypie v2 can be used to great effect by cyber-attackers. In less than
30 seconds, a WPA handshake can be captured and an nmap scan searching for
often vulnerable ports can be conducted on a target network from nearly 2200 meters
away. In order to evaluate the prototype’s capabilities further, attenuation is added
and more measurements taken.
81



















200 14 -45.1429 -46 -37.2729 -7.87 -8.7271 2.9051 8.4396
400 15 -56.1333 -56 -43.2935 -12.8398 -12.7065 0.5164 0.2667
600 15 -57.7333 -58 -46.8153 -10.9180 -11.1847 1.0328 1.0667
800 15 -62.4 -62 -49.3141 -13.0859 -12.6859 1.0556 1.1143
1000 15 -64.6667 -64 -51.2523 -13.4144 -12.7477 1.2344 1.5238
1200 15 -69.2 -70 -52.8359 -16.3641 -17.1641 1.8205 3.3143
1400 15 -68.9333 -68 -54.1748 -14.7585 -13.8252 1.0328 1.0667
1600 15 -72.5333 -72 -55.3347 -17.1986 -16.6653 2.0656 4.2667
1800 15 -69.7333 -70 -56.3577 -13.3756 -13.6423 1.4864 2.2095
2000 18 -73.8889 -74 -57.2729 -16.616 -16.7271 1.6047 2.5752
2200 13 -74.308 -74 -58.1007 -16.207 -15.8993 2.4285 5.8974
Averages: -13.8771 -13.8159 1.5621 2.8855
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5.3 Experiment 2: 15 dB Added Attenuation
As discussed in Section 4.3 in order to simulate further distances, an attenuator
is added to the skypie v2. Then, the distance at which experiment 2’s attacks would
have occurred (without attenuation) can be calculated with the FSPL. Note that this
experiment is conducted at the same location as the first. Figure 32 displays all the
RSSI readings of the second experiment in a boxplot graph.
Figure 32: Boxplot of the dBm at each test location (experiment 2)
5.3.1 Attenuator Analysis
In order to verify that the attenuator functioned as expected before field use, it is
tested with a signal analyzer. The 15 dB attenuator weakens an incoming 2.4 GHz
signal by its advertised dB rating. Interestingly, comparisons of the RSSI measure-
ments of the first and second experiments at seven matching locations (see Table 10)
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shows the skypie v2 in the 15 dB attenuator configuration performed much closer to
the expected (i.e., Column Measured Mean is closer to Column Expected). In Figure
33 the average measured RSSI values and expected values are graphed at each of
the collection points from Table 10. Experiment 2’s error is on average -6.5482 dBm
which is weaker than the expected compared to the -15.4192 dBm that of the first
experiment. These differences are illustrated in Figure 33.
The expected values for the 15 dB configuration were calculated using a similar
equation to Equation 4 that subtracts the signal weakening (Atten) from the atten-
uator. The new formula is
Prx = Ptx +Gtx +Grx − FSPL− Atten (5)
The summary of the RSSI results for experiment 2 are displayed in Table 11 and
averages plotted in Figure 34. The average error over the 20 different distances (-
6.9875) is only slightly higher than that of the seven matching locations (-6.5482)
between experiment 1 and 2. Comparing experiment 1’s average mean error with 165
trials to experiment 2’s with 147 trails, experiment 2’s mean error improves by 50%.
The difference in error could have been affected by the experiments being conducted
on different days with different weather conditions, but because of size of the difference
in error, it is likely there is another unknown factor at work. While the difference in
error between the two configurations may lead to better understanding of the factors
affecting the error, additional investigation is outside of the scope of this research.
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Figure 33: Average measured RSSI values (solid lines) between the two experiments and their expected values (dashed lines)
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Figure 34: Average measured RSSI values (solid line) of experiment 2 and its expected values (dashed lines)
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1 1000 15 -64.666 -64 -51.2523 -13.4144 -12.7477 1.2344 1.5238
1 1200 15 -69.2 -70 -52.8359 -16.3641 -17.1641 1.8205 3.3143
1 1400 15 -68.9333 -68 -54.1748 -14.7585 -13.8252 1.0328 1.0667
1 1600 15 -72.5333 -72 -55.3347 -17.1986 -16.6653 2.0656 4.26667
1 1800 15 -69.7333 -70 -56.3577 -13.3756 -13.6423 1.4864 2.2095
1 2000 18 -73.8889 -74 -57.2729 -16.616 -16.7271 1.6047 2.5752
1 2200 13 -74.3077 -74 -58.1007 -16.207 -15.8993 2.4285 5.8974
2 1000 14 -71.2857 -72 -66.2523 -5.0334 -5.7477 0.9945 0.9890
2 1200 6 -74.6667 -74 -67.8359 -6.8308 -6.1641 1.0328 1.0667
2 1400 10 -76.2 -76 -69.1748 -7.0252 -6.8252 1.1353 1.2889
2 1600 10 -77.8 -78 -70.3347 -7.4653 -7.6653 1.7512 3.0667
2 1800 8 -78.5 -78 -71.3577 -7.1423 -6.6423 0.9258 0.8571
2 2000 6 -78 -78 -72.2729 -5.7271 -5.7271 0 0
2 2200 7 -79.7143 -80 -73.1007 -6.6136 -6.8993 0.7559 0.5714
Experiment 1
Averages: -15.4192 -15.2387 1.6676 2.9791
Experiment 2
Averages: -6.5482 -6.5244 0.9422 1.12
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950 15 -68.1333 -68 -65.8067 -2.3266 -2.1933 0.5164 0.2667
1000 14 -71.2857 -72 -66.2523 -5.0334 -5.7477 0.9945 0.9890
1050 7 -72 -72 -66.6761 -5.3239 -5.3239 0 0
1100 15 -72.8 -72 -67.0801 -5.7199 -4.9199 1.0328 1.0667
1200 6 -74.6667 -74 -67.8359 -6.8308 -6.1641 1.0328 1.0667
1375 5 -76.4 -76 -69.0183 -7.3817 -6.9817 0.8944 0.8
1400 10 -76.2 -76 -69.1748 -7.0252 -6.8252 1.1353 1.2889
1425 5 -76 -76 -69.3286 -6.6714 -6.6714 -76 0
1450 8 -77.75 -78 -69.4796 -8.2704 -8.5204 1.2817 1.6429
1475 5 -78 -78 -69.6281 -8.3719 -8.3719 0 0
1500 5 -77.2 -78 -69.7741 -7.4259 -8.2259 1.0954 1.2
1525 5 -78.8 -78 -69.9177 -8.8823 -8.0823 1.0954 1.2
1550 5 -78.4 -78 -70.0589 -8.3411 -7.9411 1.6733 2.8
1575 5 -78.4 -78 -70.1979 -8.2021 -7.8021 0.8944 0.8
1600 10 -77.8 -78 -70.3347 -7.4653 -7.6653 1.7512 3.0667
1625 5 -78.4 -78 -70.4693 -7.9307 -7.5307 0.8944 0.8
1650 6 -78.3333 -78 -70.6019 -7.7314 -7.3981 0.8165 0.6667
1800 8 -78.5 -78 -71.3577 -7.1423 -6.6423 0.9258 0.8571
2000 6 -78 -78 -72.2729 -5.7271 -5.7271 0 0
2200 7 -79.7143 -80 -73.1007 -6.6136 -6.8993 0.7559 0.5714
Averages: -6.9875 -6.8817 -3.0121 0.9008
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5.3.2 WPA Handshake Capture Results
As skypie v2 is moved towards the target AP (i.e., start at 2200 m and move
towards 950 m), the WPA Handshake Capture attack is tested at 8 different locations
as shown in shown in Figure 35. Only after reaching 1100 meters did the attack not
timeout on its first attempt. From 1100 m to 950 m, the time to success dropped
dramatically, which indicates the limit of the WPA handshake capture is near 1200
meters in this configuration.
Figure 35: Boxplot of time to capture handshake at each test location (experiment
2)
This limit is not due to skypie v2’s inability to capture packets from the AP,
as inspecting the Wireshark capture files of the 1200 meter location indicates that
messages 1 and 3 (from the AP) of the four-way handshake are still successfully
captured. Additionally, the advertised maximum transmit power of the HP Zbook
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15 is 22.3872 mW which is lower than the AP. Due to the target network laptops
transmitting at a lower power, the traffic attenuates below the sensitivity of skypie
v2 over a smaller distance. This transmit power difference is expected and simulates
a realistic network setup. One additional variable that can affect transmit power is
Windows 10’s power configurations that automatically adjusts the transmit power
to conserve power as conditions are met. Some of these conditions include whether
a laptop is plugged in (experiment 1 and 2 ran on battery power), which power
plan is selected, and what battery percentage the laptop is at. These Windows 10
configurations were left as the default.
With the RSSI analysis from Section 5.3.1 and knowing the farthest location where
the handshake capture attack did not timeout, it is possible to calculate the approxi-
mate max distance an unattenuated attack would have success. By manipulating (3)
and (4), and adding an error variable (Error) to account for the unexpected signal
weakening (discussed in Section 5.2.4), the formulas for calculating distance are









See Appendix E for the derivation of distance from (3).
Using mean error (-13.8771) and the mean RSSI reading (-72.8 dBm) at the 1100
meter (i.e., the farthest distance where WPA handshake capture was possible) location
found in Table 9 and 11 respectively, the max distance for a handshake capture attack
is calculated as 2418.42 meters. Using the same mean error and the mean RSSI
reading for the 1200 meter location (-74.6667 dBm), it is calculated that the WPA
handshake capture becomes untenable between 2418.42 and 2998.24 meters.
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5.3.3 Ping Results
The packet loss on this experiment has significantly higher variance compared to
the first experiment. As skypie v2 moved farther from the AP, packet loss trended
upward in a linear fashion (Figure 36). Similar to the results of the first experiment,
the median packet loss stayed within 0 to 10 percent from 950 to 1100 meters. Only
after the signal strength fell to a median of -76 dBm at 1375 meters, did the median
packet loss exceed 10 percent. This is the point at which the linear trend for packet
loss began.
Packet loss is acceptable in some circumstances and is often handled by Reliable
Data Transfer (RDT) protocols, but higher packet loss significantly affects the quality
of service between devices. This is especially true for real-time services. For example,
Voice over IP (VoIP)’s quality is significantly affected by “5% and 10%” packet loss
[58]. Therefore, in order to keep skypie v2 operational viability flexible, maintaining
distance within this packet loss range is advised.
5.3.4 nmap Results
Results in Section 5.2.3, suggest nmap scans should successfully identify all hosts
where the ping results have low packet loss (950-1100 meters). As expected, all
hosts are identified in that range with the exception of 1000 meters which identified
a median of 90 percent of hosts. The percentage of host identified from the nmap
attack are shown in Figure 37. Even at the 1200 meter mark, where packet loss is not
recorded, nmap identified all hosts excluding one outlier. This indicates that packet
loss is kept reasonably low at this location.
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Figure 36: Boxplot of ping packet loss at each test location with a trend line (experiment 2)
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The nmap scans took a mean 26.9562 seconds to complete which is slightly higher
than the 20.6564 mean completion time of the first experiment. This slight increase
in time is expected as nmap automatically slows itself down as it detects dropped
packets or higher latency.
Only after the mean signal strength reached -76.2 dBm and the packet loss varied
between 20-80% at 1400 meters, did the nmap results also begin to vary widely. As
calculated for the 1200 meter location (i.e., the farthest distance where nmap scans
identified all hosts) in Section 5.3.2, it is expected for nmap attacks in similar ideal
conditions to be viable 2998.24 meters from a target AP. Using the mean RSSI of
the 1400 meter location (-76.2 dBm) and in (6) and (7), it is calculated that packet
loss would become too high to produce consistent nmap scan results between 2998.24
meters and 3577.10 meters.
Figure 37: Boxplot of hosts identified by nmap at each test location (experiment 2)
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5.3.5 Experiment Summary
Experiment 2 expands on the findings of experiment 1 and demonstrates that all of
the CNAs can be conducted at significantly farther distances observed in experiment
1. The WPA handshake capture attack is expected to be effective an additional 200
meters, equating to over 2400 meters away from the target, or at an RSSI reading
of -72 dBm. Similarly, the nmap scan is expected to be possible nearly 3000 meters
from a target network or at an RSSI reading of -74 dBm. Although packet loss is
not measured between the 1100 and 1375, meter locations based on the results of the
nmap scan attack at 1200 meters (discussed in Section 5.3.4) indicates low packet
loss is maintained at -74 dBm.
Since RSSI is a measurement of power that factors in signal degradation regardless
of cause (i.e., distance or passing through materials), RSSI is considered the best
measure of effectiveness when discussing skypie v2. Knowing the required RSSI for
a particular attack can aid network defenders taking steps to limit their buildings’
wireless emissions. It also demonstrates the considerable threat that the DWAP
poses.
5.4 Realistic Network
Knowing these attacks are possible at long distances and their limits, their po-
tential against a realistic network setup can be discussed. The experiment in this
research does not include any added attenuation from buildings, which is where a
large majority of wireless networks are located. Since no one network setup is likely
to be the same as another, different building construction materials and variety of
different possible configurations are examined.
Table 12 contains the attenuation of common building materials [59] and their
calculated effect on the distance at which skypie v2’s four-way handshake attack and
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nmap scan could be conducted. These values are calculated with (6) and (7) and using
the mean RSSI error reading from experiment 1 (-13.8771 dBm). The total added
attenuation from building materials are added to the error variable. For example, if
a target network is in a building constructed with drywall, fiberglass, plywood, tar
paper, and stucco the traffic skypie v2’s is -17.3902 dB weaker, which results in the
following WPA handshake capture and nmap distance:
FSPL = −72dBm+ 3.5dB + 18dB + (10 ∗ log10(537mW ))









FSPL = −74dBm+ 3.5dB + 18dB + (10 ∗ log10(537mW ))









In the table each individual material is listed and then some of the worst case scenarios
are derived. The worst case scenarios assume a similar interior make up (drywall,
fiberglass insulation, fir lumber frame, plywood exterior walls, and tar paper weather
proofing) and three different exterior walls (red brick, cinder block, and stucco). Since
building frames have gaps and a signal may not have to pass through a fir lumber beam
to escape the building, each scenario is calculated with and without its attenuation.
As shown in the table, attenuation can vary widely based on the material the
the signal has to pass through. If a wireless AP is placed haphazardly next to a
window, the building’s signal emissions are bound to be high. The added -0.4998 dB
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of attenuation only limits each attack by a few hundred meters each:
FSPL = −72dBm+ 3.5dB + 18dB + (10 ∗ log10(537mW ))









FSPL = −74dBm+ 3.5dB + 18dB5 + (10 ∗ log10(537mW ))









If it is assumed that a target structure has a similar interior make up of drywall,
fiberglass insulation, fir lumber frame, plywood exterior walls, and tar paper weather
proofing some of the worst case scenarios can be estimated. If the building is covered
with a red brick exterior and has no windows, -6.9621 to -9.751 dB of added attenua-
tion can be expected. For cinder block, the building has between -9.2413 and -12.0302
dB of added attenuation, each of which still puts all of the attacks only hundreds of
meters away from the target. The strongest attenuation occurs when a stucco finish
is added to an exterior wall. When applied to a plywood wall, diamond mesh is first
affixed to the wall and the concrete stucco mixture is applied over top. This alone
adds -14.863 dB of attenuation and between -17.3902 and -20.1791 total added dB
can be expected. However, this still allows an attack to conduct a handshake capture
216 meters away, and nmap scans 272 meters away, which is still outside the audible
range of 100 meters.
96
Table 12: Common Building Material’s Attenuation [59] and the Effects to skypie v2’s Attacks
Attenuation:
-0.4998 -0.4937 -0.0241 -2.7889 -1.9138 -0.0956 -4.4349 -6.7141 -14.863
Total hanshake nmap
Added capture Scan
Fiber- Fir Ply- Tar Red Cinder Atten- Distance Distance
Glass Drywall glass Lumber wood Paper Brick Block Stucco uation (meters) (meters)
x -0.4998 2082.29 2621.45
x -0.4937 2083.75 2623.29
x -0.0241 2199.51 2769.02
x -2.7889 1599.87 2014.12
x -1.9138 1769.46 2227.62
x -0.0956 2181.48 2746.32
x -4.4349 1323.69 1666.42
x -6.7141 1018.18 1281.81
x -14.863 398.45 501.62
x x x x x -17.3902 297.86 374.99
x x x x x x -20.1791 216.06 272.00
x x x x x -9.2413 761.14 958.22
x x x x x x -12.0302 552.10 695.05
x x x x x -6.9621 989.52 1245.73
x x x x x x -9.751 717.76 903.61
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Because buildings and wireless network configurations will always be an uncontrol-
lable variable, the max effective range of the skypie v2 is going to vary. Regardless,
the results show that even under some heavy attenuation situations the skypie v2
attack range remains large. To defend against this sort of attack it is important
for network administrators to consider mitigation and evaluate their building signal
emissions.
Physical security such as walls and security personnel can be easily surpassed
by a drone, as depicted in Figure 12, to give an attacker RPP. For example, if the
target building is in the cinder block configuration discussed above, the attacker
could direct the skypie v2 to get within 552 meters of the target (usurping physical
security) to conduct a WPA handshake capture attack. Once captured and uploaded
to an FTP server via a cellular connection, the DWAP could move 695 meters away
from the target and await the attacker to crack the wireless password on a more
powerful workstation. Located nearly 700 meters from the target and with a cracked
password, the skypie v2 could then connect to the AP and conduct an nmap scan of
the target network.
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VI. Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Overview
This chapter summarizes the research and the findings of the experiments con-
ducted throughout. Section 6.2 reiterates the conclusions drawn from the experiments
and analysis. Section 6.3 discusses potential countermeasures. Finally, Section 6.4 is
dedicated to a roadmap of future work in the field of cyber-attack drones.
This research is successful in demonstrating that an inexpensive and lightweight
drone-mounted wireless attack platform (skypie v2) can conduct CNAs against a
network at distances greater than 800 meters. When the network’s wireless traffic
does not experience added building attenuation, attacks via the skypie v2 are highly
effective up to 2200 meters. To better understand the attacks’ limits and attempt to
overcome test distance limitations, an additional experiment is run with an attenuator
added to simulate additional distance. The experiment shows that WPA handshake
capture is possible as far as 2418 meters away and nmap scans as far as 2998 meters
away.
Also discussed is skypie v2’s potential effectiveness against a realistic network
setup. This is done by using the known attenuation values for common building
materials and calculating the range of each attack after factoring in the attenuation.
Through this process each of the following research goals were me:
• Can CNAs be accomplished at 800+ meters using lightweight equipment on a
cyber-attack drone?
• If so, how long does each attack take?
• At what distance do they become infeasible?
• How effective would these attacks be against a realistic network setup?
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6.2 Research Conclusions
It is found that CNAs are possible far beyond the hypothesized distance of 800
meter distance with the lightweight equipment of the skypie v2. Therefore this re-
search proves the hypothesis. WPA handshake attacks can be conducted effectively
(under 30 seconds) as far as 2400 meters from the target, and packet loss/nmap scans
are reliable until the RSSI reading falls below -76 dBm. Under similar conditions, it
is expected that additional network attacks and reconnaissance could be conducted
as far as 2998 meters from the target.
After conducting the experiments a median error of -13.8771 dBm is calculated
from the expected RSSI over the 2200-meter distance. The experiment is designed to
minimize attenuation factors, but often uncontrollable factors affect wireless traffic.
Discovery of the factor(s) causing the unexpected loss could enable corrections/up-
grades that would significantly improve skypie v2’s performance. Regardless of the
error, after conducting an analysis of how known construction material would attenu-
ate a 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi signal, it is found that even with heavy building attenuation the
skypie v2 can be effective. If a target AP is located in a building that added 20 db of
attenuation, it is calculated that a WPA2 handshake capture could be accomplished
216 meters from the AP and an nmap scan 272 meters. This is still outside the au-
dible range of a drone, and if the target AP is located near windows it is expected
CNAs can work multiple times those distances, because glass only attenuates a Wi-Fi
signal by 0.5 dB.
When conducting WPA handshake capture attacks, the network devices (laptops)
limit the range rather than the AP. This is because the network devices transmitted
their traffic at a lower power than the AP. When conducting these CNAs, it should
be assumed that the network devices transmit at different powers based on their
hardware, power configuration settings, and whether the 802.11 TPC feature is being
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used. The lower transmit power is only a limiting factor when capturing the WPA
handshake and not the nmap scan. Since nmap scan traffic is facilitated by the AP,
the range of the nmap scan is only limited by the attenuation between the AP and
skypie v2.
The FSPL formula was not considered before the formation of the hypothesis and
this impacted the educated guess on the effective distance. It was only after experi-
ment 1 that the FSPL equation was examined. Regardless, through this research it
is demonstrated that DWAPs equipped with a directional antenna pose a significant
threat. The rise of such a capability requires the need for new countermeasures.
6.3 Research Contributions
This research contributes to the body of wireless attack drone research, specifically
airborne CNAs utilizing a directional antenna. It shows empirically that cyber-attack
drones can be highly effective tools capable of completing attacks well over 2200 m
from a target. Additionally, development of a inexpensive prototype capable of several
CNAs which models a motivated lone threat actor’s capabilities is accomplished.
6.4 Limitations
This research has the following limitations:
• All CNAs are conducted in an open field. This prevents any additional attenu-
ations due to obstacles. While this does not simulate a realistic network setup,
it eliminates unknown factors and helps control experimental results.
• The location (optimal bearing) of the target network is assumed to be known.
• CNA are conducted from a prototype that is mounted and extended on a tele-
scoping pole to simulate drone flight. Testing did not include real drone flight.
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• Although capable of interaction with 5 GHz Wi-Fi devices, the CNAs are limited
to a 2.4 GHz network.
6.5 Countermeasures
Over the course of this research, development, and experiments in the field of
cyber-attack drones several countermeasures have been identified that would signifi-
cantly increase the complexity or stop CNAs from being conducted by this platform.
Below is a list of those countermeasures:
• Limiting Building Wireless Emissions. The vulnerability of unintended
signal emissions has been around for many years and was given the code name
TEMPEST in 1972 [60]. But, with the advent of highly capable COTS drones
and inexpensive hacking hardware, the issue of implementing mitigations has
become more pressing. The most straightforward approach, while not always the
cheapest, is to limit the wireless emissions leaving a building. This can be done
several ways. The first is to carefully assess the placement of client and station
devices. Unfortunately, client device location is not always in the control of
network administrators and stations best coverage locations may not be ideally
located. The second way is to construct buildings with Radio Frequency (RF)
attenuation materials that are designed to eliminate unwanted wireless emission.
These materials come in many forms such as film, foil, paint, and fabrics [61].
While some of these materials need to be applied during construction, some can
easily be retroactively applied like paint and window films.
• Migrate to WPA3. WPA2’s security has been compromised for many years
now and even when devices are fully updated (like this research’s equipment),
they are still vulnerable. Now that WPA3 has been released and devices are
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receiving certifications, migration to capable wireless devices should be a top
priority. As discussed in Section 2.5.6, WPA3 implements a dragonfly hand-
shake which is not vulnerable to offline cracking like WPA2’s four-way hand-
shake. WPA3 also prevents erroneous deauthentication messages with MFP.
Some vulnerabilities were already discovered with WPA3, but have since been
patched and is still considered more secure than WPA2.
• Randomized MAC Addresses. This research’s software packages takes ad-
vantage of the constant MAC addresses that wireless APs advertise in beacon
packets. These beacon MAC addresses make profiling devices trivial and skypie
v2’s code relied heavily on this information. If a mechanism can be implemented
to rotate or randomize the MAC addresses, it would significantly increase the
complexity of identifying devices and require another form of identification like
radio frequency fingerprinting.
• Periodic Wi-Fi Passphrase Changes and Unique SSIDs. If migration to
WPA3 is not yet possible, changing the passphrase for a network on a schedule
is recommended. Every time this is done, an attacker is required to recap-
ture the four-way handshake and crack the passphrase. Frequently changing
the passphrase to strong passphrases and having unique SSIDs can be a strong
deterrence against attackers who have previously broken into a network. Break-
ing strong passphrases requires a workstation with significant power, and unique
SSIDs eliminate the option of using precomputed rainbow tables.
6.6 Future Work
The work on skypie v2 was done with the express goal of proving the effectiveness
of an inexpensive and lightweight cyber-attack drone equipped with a directional
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antenna. There are many avenues for improvements that could enhance this field of
research. Some of those improvements include:
• Drone Mounted/Realistic Network Performance Evaluation. The ex-
periments conducted in this research simulated flight by mounting skypie v2 to
a telescoping pole and elevating it 13 feet in the air. This is a good simulation
of drone flight, but may be more stable and less affected by gusts of wind. To
fully assess its capabilities in flight, skypie should be mounted to a real drone.
This coupled with a set of scenarios targeting networks in buildings would be
an excellent showcase of what the cyber-attack drone platform can accomplish.
• Additional CNA and CNE Features. The ground work for connecting
and interacting with Wi-Fi devices was accomplished during this research’s
development phase, and several key capabilities were added. But there are
many more useful features that can be added. These capabilities could include:
probe request client tracking, WPA2 KRACK attack, or MITM attacks. For
example, probe requests reveal connection history of client devices to SSIDs.
With geolocated-SSID information readily available online [3], probe requests
could be used to identify and track individuals.
• Compatibility With More Wireless Protocols. The developed software
package is extensively developed to capture, transport, and provide analysis of
Wi-Fi traffic. Adding software and hardware support for additional wireless pro-
tocols would make skypie more of a universal cyber-attack platform. This could
include Bluetooth, ZigBee, and even cellular wireless protocols. Expanding the
attack surface in this way would allow for targeted attacks against almost any
wireless device.
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Appendix A. Skypie v2 Default Configuration File
1 ## Skypie Config F i l e . Modifying t h i s f i l e ( skypie−c o n f i g ) a l t e r s the
behavior o f the program .
2
3 # SFTP Server
4 [ f i l e s e r v e r ]
5 # Sensor ’ s name , c r e a t e s unique s to rage l o c a t i o n on skyport . Use fu l f o r
mu l t ip l e s e n s o r s .
6 name=starchy
7 # Creden t i a l s f o r the SFTP account o f the sensor ’ s name
8 v e r i f i e r=catsWears100Sweaters !
9 # Port to connect over SFTP f o r uploading / downloading senso r data
10 s f t p p o r t =2222
11 # IP/hostname to connect over SFTP f o r uploading / downloading senso r data
12 s f t p s e r v e r=f tp . b a l l l a b o r a t o r i e s . org
13 # Weather f i l e s w i l l be de l e t ed or kept a f t e r uploading to the remote
s e r v e r
14 remove a f t e r up load=False
15
16 # Logging S e t t i n g s
17 [ l og ]
18 # F i l e l ogg ing l e v e l . You may want to s e t t h i s to ’ none ’ i f you are
worr ied about the senso r being d i s cove r ed . [ debug , in fo , warning ,
c r i t i c a l , none ]
19 l o g g i n g l e v e l=debug
20 # Debug f i l e s i z e . How big (kB) each f i l e w i l l be be f o r e s p l i t .
Smal ler s i z e s g ive feedback f a s t e r , but b igge r s i z e s are e a s i e r to
manage .
21 l o g g i n g s i z e =50
22
23 #Bluetooth C o l l e c t i o n ( not implemented )
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24 [ b luetooth ]
25 # MAC of Bluetooth antenna used f o r c o l l e c t i o n . Bluetooth i s not
supported . Used as a p l a c eho lde r .
26 bluetooth mac=XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX
27
28 # WiFi C o l l e c t i o n
29 [ w i f i ]
30 # Mode the w i f i w i l l be in . This a f f e c t s the mirror and c o l l e c t i o n
threads [ o f f , c o l l e c t , mirror ]
31 mode=c o l l e c t
32 # MAC of WiFi antenna used f o r c o l l e c t i o n . Current ly supports only 1 .
Can use only f i r s t h a l f to denote j u s t manufacturerer ( example : aa :
bb : cc )
33 antenna mac =00:25:22
34 # C o l l e c t i o n i n t e r v a l in seconds
35 i n t e r v a l =30
36 # S i z e in mB of b u f f e r f o r p r e f e r r e d packets ( s e e bookmarks f i l e ) .
Oldest f i l e s w i l l be removed when f u l l .
37 s ize bookmarks =500
38 # S i z e in mB of b u f f e r f o r enve lope data ( geo , compass , and packet
summary data )
39 s i z e e n v e l o p e s =500
40 # S i z e in mB of a l l packets captured
41 s i z e r a w =500
42 # Turn o f f c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l packets , used to save space [ on , o f f ]
43 r a w c o l l e c t=on
44 # Max s i z e in mB of c o l l e c t e d f i l e s
45 f i l e s i z e i n t e r v a l =10
46 # Raw f i l t e r ( l i b c a p format ) , the f i l t e r the antenna w i l l use as the
b a s i s f o r c o l l e c t i o n . Only packets in t h i s f i l t e r w i l l be c o l l e c t e d
47 r a w f i l t e r= wlan [ 0 ] == 0x80
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48 # Bookmark f i l t e r s ( l i b c a p format ) . Bookmarks are the only packets that
are sent d i r e c t l y to skyport . They are a subse s t o f the raw packets
c o l l e c t e d .
49 # Mult ip l e f i l t e r s are a l lowed . Seperate by a new l i n e , be sure to
indent each l i n e with at l e a s t one space . Each one r e q u i r e s
p r o c e s s i n g time , so i t ’ s not recommended to do more than 4 .
50 b o o k m a r k s f i l t e r s=wlan . f c . type subtype == 4
51 wlan mgt . s s i d==”Stowaway Lounge”
52 wlan f c . type == 2
53 wlan . f c . type subtype == 8
54
55 # MirrorMode
56 [ mirror ]
57 # The MAC of the attack plat form . This dev i c e must be with in range o f
the WiFi i n t e r f a c e o f the C2 machine
58 attack mac=AA:AA:BB:BB:CC:CC
59 # The MAC of the v ic t im .
60 target mac=AA:AA:BB:BB:CC:CC
61 # ’ All ’ w i l l forward any t r a f f i c de s t ined f o r the target ’ s MAC address ,
a l l ow ing the a t tacke r to send spoofed MAC frames . [ a l l , a t t a ck on ly ]
62 f o r w a r d a t t a c k s i d e=a l l
63 # [ a l l , t a r g e t o n l y ]
64 f o r w a r d t a r g e t s i d e=t a r g e t o n l y
65
66 # Telemetry
67 [ t e l emetry ]
68 # [ on , o f f ] Store geo data
69 mode=on
70 # Max s i z e in mB of te l emetry data
71 s i z e =80
72 # Length o f time be f o r e data i s wr i t t en to a f i l e in seconds
73 i n t e r v a l =42
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74 # Ca l i b ra t i on f o r the acce l e romete r /magnometer . Adjust so that the
bear ing read ings are c l o s e to 0 when the s enso r i s f a c i n g north .
Min= −360, Max= 360
75 b e a r i n g o f f s e t = −75
76
77 # Update/ Trans fe r Management
78 [ update ]
79 # How o f t en c o n f i g changes are downloaded ( in seconds ) from the SFTP
s e r v e r . 0 = Constant download attempts
80 download wait= 30
81 # Time to wait ( in seconds ) a f t e r a data upload completes be f o r e
i n i t i a t i n g another . 0 = Constant upload attempts
82 upload wait= 999
83 # Changing to ’ shutdown ’ n o t i f i e s a l l opera t ing threads they need to
shutdown . A g e n t l e way to shut down . Off i s maintained when a l l
the threads are done . S e l f d e s t r u c t w i l l f i l l the hard dr iv e with 0 ’ s
u n t i l the system cra she s . [ on , shutdown , o f f , s e l f d e s t r u c t ]
84 s k y p i e o p e r a t i o n=on
85
86 #Attack Parameters
87 [ at tack ]
88 #capture = s t a r t deauth and handshake thread to capture 4way handshake
89 #connect = connect to attack mac AP with given password
90 #nmap = nmap connected network
91 mode = capture
92 #number o f deauth packets to send
93 packets = 1
94 #MAC address o f the t a r g e t AP
95 attack mac = AA:AA:BB:BB:CC:CC
96 #password to be used to connect to attack mac AP
97 password =
98 #nmap parameters to be used
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99 nmap params = −sn −T3 192.168.43.1−254
100 #ping IP
101 p i n g i p = 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 4 3 . 3 2
102 #how o f t en to san f o r a v a i l a b l e APs and switch channe l s i f needed
103 s c a n i n t e r v a l = 30
104 #attack thread timeout msgs
105 message =
106 #Attack thread timeout v a r i a b l e s in seconds
107 capture t imeout = 30
108 connect t imeout = 30
109 nmap timeout = 30
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Appendix B. HAT RGB LED Array Indication List
Table 13: HAT RGB LED Array Indication List
Indicator Event
Sky Blue Fill Skypie program initialization
Purple Fill System is on and waiting to start the control loop. If this color
persists, skypie is awaiting a GPS fix to synchronize the system clock.
Green Fill Indicates a passive Wi-Fi collection thread has been started
Blue Fill Indicates that the telemetry collection thread has been started
Pink Fill Indicates that an upload or download with the FTP has been started
Yellow Fill Indicates an attack thread has been started
(handshake capture, deauth, nmap)
Pink Flashing Indicates that upload or download has failed multiple
times due to no connection
White Number Indicates which channel the skypie is listening on
Red Number Indicates a buffer check or change has occurred
Orange Number Indicates the state file has been written to
Flashing Red Indicates a self-destruct has been initiated
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Appendix C. Python Thread For Managing Wireless
Connections
1 import l ogg ing
2 import thread ing
3 from skyp ie import i n t e r f a c e
4 import time
5 import s h u t i l
6 from wpasuppl icantconf import WpaSupplicantConf
7 from i o import Str ingIO
8 from subproces s import PIPE , Popen
9 import re
10
11 module logger = logg ing . getLogger ( name )
12
13 c l a s s ConnectThread ( thread ing . Thread ) :
14
15 de f i n i t ( s e l f , i f a c e , s s id , address , password ,
connectedNetworkPath ) :
16 super ( ) . i n i t ( )
17 s e l f . daemon = True
18 s e l f . i f a c e = i f a c e
19 s e l f . s s i d = s s i d
20 s e l f . addre s s = address
21 s e l f . password = ’ ” ’ + password + ’ ” ’
22 s e l f . event = thread ing . Event ( )
23 s e l f . connectedNetworkPath = connectedNetworkPath
24 s e l f . connected = False
25
26 module logger . i n f o ( ” [ ] S t a r t i ng connect thread in s t ance .
Attempting to connect to {}” . format ( s e l f . s s i d ) )
27
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28 # Ensure we are in monitor mode , i f not s e t i t
29 whi l e i n t e r f a c e . g e t i n t e r f a c e m o d e ( s e l f . i f a c e ) != ”managed” :
30 i n t e r f a c e . s e t i n t e r f a c e m o d e ( s e l f . i f a c e , ”managed” )
31
32 de f run ( s e l f ) :
33
34 #Read wpa suppl icant c o n f i g f i l e
35 f i l e = ’ / e t c / wpa suppl icant / wpa suppl icant . conf ’
36 with open ( f i l e , ’ r ’ ) as my f i l e :
37 data = myf i l e . read ( )
38 data = Str ingIO ( data )
39 conf = WpaSupplicantConf ( data )
40
41 #Add attack network and wr i t e to d i sk
42 conf . add network ( s e l f . s s i d , psk=s e l f . password , key mgmt=’WPA−
PSK ’ )
43 output = Str ingIO ( )
44 conf . wr i t e ( output )
45 with open ( f i l e , ’w ’ ) as my f i l e :
46 output . seek (0 )
47 s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e o b j ( output , my f i l e )
48
49 data . c l o s e ( )
50 output . c l o s e ( )
51
52 #p r in t ( conf . networks ( ) )
53 #Force wpa suppl icant to read updated c o n f i g f i l e
54 reconfigCommand = [ ’ wpa c l i ’ , ’− i ’ , s e l f . i f a c e , ’ r e c o n f i g u r e ’ ]
55 proc = Popen ( reconfigCommand , stdout=PIPE , s t d e r r=PIPE)
56 proc . wait ( )
57 proc . terminate ( )
58
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59 #S e l e c t the t a r g e t network f o r connect
60 connectCommand = [ ’ wpa c l i ’ , ’− i ’ , s e l f . i f a c e , ’ s e l e c t n e t w o r k ’
, s t r ( l i s t ( conf . networks ( ) . keys ( ) ) . index ( s e l f . s s i d ) ) ]
61 proc = Popen ( connectCommand , stdout=PIPE , s t d e r r=PIPE)
62 proc . wait ( )
63 proc . terminate ( )
64
65 time . s l e e p (3 )
66
67 #Check i f connected
68 stateCommand = [ ’ wpa c l i ’ , ’− i ’ , s e l f . i f a c e , ’ s t a t u s ’ ]
69 proc = Popen ( stateCommand , stdout=PIPE , s t d e r r=PIPE)
70 c u r r l i n e = ””
71 whi l e not ” wpa state=” in c u r r l i n e :
72 c u r r l i n e = proc . s tdout . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
73 i f re . sub ( r ” [\n\ t \ s ]∗ ” , ”” , c u r r l i n e ) == ’ wpa state=COMPLETED’ :
74 s e l f . connected = True
75 module logger . i n f o ( ” [+] Connected S u c c e s f u l l y to {} ” . format
( s e l f . s s i d ) )
76 with open ( s e l f . connectedNetworkPath , ’w ’ ) as f :
77 f . wr i t e ( s e l f . addre s s + ”\n” )
78 f . c l o s e ( )
79 e l s e :
80 module logger . i n f o ( ” [− ] Fa i l ed to Connect to {} ” . format (
s e l f . s s i d ) )
81
82 proc . terminate ( )
83 time . s l e e p (5 )
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Appendix D. Startup Shell Script
1 #! / bin / sh
2 RESULTS=$$ ( pgrep −a f python )
3 SKYPIE RESULTS=$ ( echo $RESULTS | grep skyp ie )
4
5 i f [ −z ”$SKYPIE RESULTS” ]
6 then
7 echo ” [− ] Skypie i s not running . S ta r t i ng Skypie . . . ”
8 cd /home/ pi / PycharmProjects / skyp ie / skyp ie
9 python3 main . py −a −d −n− w /home/ pi / PycharmProjects / skyp ie /
skyp ie
10 e l s e
11 echo ” [+] Skypie i s running . ”
12 f i
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Appendix E. FSPL To Distance Calculation
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